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WEED AND WATER LAW: REGULATING LEGAL 
MARIJUANA  
 
Ryan B. Stoa* 
 
ABSTRACT 
Marijuana is nearing the end of its prohibition in the United States.  
Arguably the country’s largest cash crop, marijuana is already legal for 
recreational use in Colorado, Washington, Oregon, Alaska, and Washington 
DC.  Between now and election day 2016, an additional 14 states may 
place marijuana legalization initiatives on their ballots.  In addition, 23 
states and Washington DC have legalized medical marijuana, with up to 
seven states pending legislation.  The era of marijuana prohibition is rapidly 
coming to a close. 
 At the same time, traditional doctrines of water law are struggling to 
cope with the modern realities of water scarcity.  Administrative agencies 
lack capacities to monitor and enforce water rights in real-time amid rapidly 
changing conditions.  As marijuana cultivation leaves the black market and 
enters state regulatory frameworks, legal doctrines and administrative 
agencies will need to adapt in order to balance existing water rights with the 
demands of marijuana production.  Failure to do so will encourage 
producers to remain clandestine while perpetuating existing conflicts 
between legal and illegal water users.  At present there is a gap in 
understanding the relationship between water rights and marijuana 
legalization, despite their rapid convergence. 
This Article is the first to systematically address that gap.  The study 
begins by describing status quo marijuana production taking place outside 
the context of state water law doctrines, and the unsustainable conditions 
that often result.  Sections III and IV envision a legal marijuana market 
governed by the predominant doctrines of US water law: prior appropriation 
and riparianism.  In Section V the theoretical becomes reality, as 
California’s complex water laws are put to the test by the largest marijuana 
cultivation community in the United States.  Section VI concludes with 
recommendations for states in the process of legalization.  Broadly 
speaking, this Article finds that both common law and regulatory 
approaches to water allocation are capable of accommodating legal 
marijuana cultivation, but to minimize disruptions to existing water rights 
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and the marijuana industry, state agencies will need to proactively adapt to 
the new realities of the legal marijuana economy. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In late June of 2015, a convoy of vehicles carrying enforcement officers 
from four different counties of northern California drove up and into the 
remote and rugged slopes of Island Mountain.1  The mountain had been 
given its name by 18th century settlers who observed that it was nearly 
surrounded by the waters of the Eel River and its tributaries.2  Today it 
represents “the dark green heart of the Emerald Triangle,”3 a region known 
for its prolific cultivation of marijuana. The enforcement officers conducted 
open-field searches on private lands, and by the end of the week-long 
‘Operation Emerald Tri-County’ had confiscated 86,578 marijuana plants.4   
While police raids of marijuana farms is nothing new for the area, this 
particular operation raised some eyebrows.   Unusually for a raid of this 
magnitude, no federal officials were involved – the raid was a wholly state 
operation.5  Since legalizing the medicinal use and cultivation of marijuana 
in 1996,6 California has been reticent to allocate state resources towards 
marijuana enforcement, decriminalizing possession of small amounts state-
wide in 2010 and capping civil fines at $100.7  Also unusual were the lands 
being targeted by the county officers.  Seventy percent of marijuana plants 
seized by law enforcement are illegally grown on public lands,8 but this 
operation went after privately held marijuana grows with some measure of 
legal protection under the state’s Compassionate Use Act.  Until this point, 
a state raid of private lands was uncommon.  The raid thus signaled a shift 
in the enforcement of marijuana laws, but not because the counties were 
cracking down on marijuana per se.  Marijuana, like every other crop in the 
state, had fallen victim to water scarcity.    
Months earlier, in January of 2014, the Governor of California issued a 
drought state of emergency in response to ongoing shortfalls in freshwater 
supplies.9  The declaration asked state agencies and officials to “take all 
                                                 
1 Andrew Goff, Major Multi-Agency Marijuana Raid in Island Mountain Today, Local 
Coast Outpost (2015) (Aug. 12, 2015), http://goo.gl/Ga8iZs. 
2 NANCY CAPACE, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CALIFORNIA 285 (Somerset Publishers, 8th 
ed. 1999).  
3 See supra note 1. 
4 Adam Randall, Tri-County Pot Raids Net 86,578 Plants, Ukiah Daily Journal (2015) 
(Aug. 12, 2015), http://goo.gl/5h2HWZ. 
5 Adam Randall, Operation ‘Emerald Tri-County’ Nets 86,578 Marijuana Plants, 
Ukiah Daily Journal (2015) (Aug. 12, 2015), http://goo.gl/Wk82V6. 
6 Through the California Compassionate Use Act.  See Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 
11362.5 (Deering 1996). 
7 Cal. Senate Bill No. 1449 ch. 708, Marijuana: Possession (2012). 
8 National Drug Intelligence Center: Marijuana and Methamphetamine Trafficking on 
Federal Lands Threat Assessment (2005) (Aug. 29, 2015), http://goo.gl/NMa4zB. 
9 Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr.: Governor Brown Declares Drought State 
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necessary actions to prepare for these drought conditions.”10  Since then, the 
drought in California and across the United States has become a mainstream 
topic of conversation, dominating headlines11 and forcing governments to 
re-examine their water regulations.12  Water scarcity affects virtually all 
sectors of economic life, and as an agricultural commodity, marijuana is not 
immune.  There is a paucity of research on marijuana and water supplies, 
almost certainly due to the covert nature of marijuana production.13 But in 
March of 2015, the first credible scientific study of the impacts of 
cultivation on water resources found that the demand for water to irrigate 
marijuana plants often outstripped water supplies.14  Data from the study 
came from the Eel River watershed.15 
‘Operation Emerald Tri-County’ is the clearest sign yet that the rapidly 
evolving forces of marijuana legalization and water scarcity are about to 
collide.  The enforcement officers may not have been joined by federal 
officials, but they were accompanied by personnel from the state 
Department of Fish and Wildlife on suspicion of water abuses.16  Later the 
four counties claimed the raid itself was motivated by violations of state 
water regulations, not marijuana cultivation.17  After finding unpermitted 
stream bed alterations, diversions, and reservoirs, the officials moved to 
confiscate the privately grown plants.18 
In the aftermath of the raid, it became clear that the environmental 
intentions of the state may not have produced the greenest long-term 
consequences.  Several victims of the raids were members of a political 
action group working with the counties to draft ordinances that would 
increase transparency and bring growers into compliance with 
environmental laws.19  The group’s director was dismayed that the raid 
                                                                                                                            
of Emergency, Ca.gov (2014) (Aug. 12, 2015), http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18368. 
10 Id. 
11 National Drought Mitigation Center: Drought Headlines (Aug. 29, 2015), 
http://drought.unl.edu/NewsOutreach/DroughtHeadlines.aspx. 
12 Id. 
13 One researcher at the Humboldt Institute for Interdisciplinary Marijuana Research 
described the situation succinctly: “At my university, there is nobody who will even go 
near it.”  Josh Harikinson, The Landscape-Scarring, Energy-Sucking, Wildlife-Killing 
Reality of Pot Farming, Mother Jones (2014) (Aug. 12, 2015), http://goo.gl/AomDmm. 
14 Scott Bauer et al., Impacts of Surface Water Diversion for Marijuana Cultivation on 
Aquatic Habitat in Four Northwestern California Watersheds, PLOS ONE (2015). 
15 Id. at 10. 
16 See supra note 1. 
17 See supra note 5. 
18 See supra note 5. 
19 Ryan Burns, Yesterday’s Pot Bust Involved Members of California Cannabis Voice 
Humboldt, Local Coast Outpost (2015) (Aug. 12, 2015), http://goo.gl/E558B3; and Josh 
Harkinson, Police Say the Biggest Pot Raid in Years Wasn’t Really About Pot, Mother 
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would force growers back into the shadows, away from the state and 
county’s regulatory framework.20  A previous effort in 2010 was successful 
in partnering private growers with county officials to monitor plants and 
facilitate regulatory compliance, but a federal raid and subpoena of the 
program’s paperwork shut it down and broke up the partnership.21  While 
states can and should enforce water laws in the marijuana industry, doing so 
without alienating the regulatory targets will be challenging.  
This is especially true when considering the pace and mechanism of 
marijuana legalization initiatives.  Marijuana is already legal for 
recreational use in Colorado,22 Washington,23 Oregon,24 Alaska,25 and 
Washington DC.26  Between now and election day 2016, an additional 14 
states may place marijuana legalization initiatives on their ballots.27  In 
addition, 23 states and Washington DC have legalized medical marijuana, 
with up to seven states pending legislation.28  The fact that legalization is 
largely taking place through ballot initiatives suggests that the public won’t 
be waiting for state governments to get their regulatory ducks in a row.  A 
majority of Americans favor marijuana legalization,29 raising the likelihood 
that state water law doctrines will be tested sooner rather than later.   
Reconciling marijuana legalization within the structures of water laws 
and regulations reveals two broad conclusions.  First, for many states the 
legalization of marijuana is likely to strain existing water regulation 
resources, disrupt water markets, and interfere with water rights.   
Marijuana is arguably the largest cash crop in the United States,30 and while 
the industry has already been using significant water resources, simply 
enshrining historical uses is not a viable option for many jurisdictions.  On 
the other hand, states must bring marijuana producers into the fold lest the 
industry continue to operate in the shadows, and doing so will require some 
accommodations for producers to use water resources.   
Second, and conversely, water scarcity will play an increasingly large 
role in the development of the marijuana industry.  The tri-county raid set a 
                                                                                                                            
Jones (2015) (Aug. 12, 2015), http://goo.gl/tSX9Rx. 
20 Id. 
21 See supra note 13. 
22 Colorado Marijuana Legalization Initiative, CO. CONST. Amendment 64 (2012).  
23 Washington Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, Initiative 502 (2012). 
24 Oregon Legalized Marijuana Initiative, Measure 91 (2014). 
25 Alaska Marijuana Legalization, Ballot Measure 2 (2014). 
26 Washington D.C. Marijuana Legalization, Initiative 71 (2014). 
27 Ballotpedia: Marijuana on the Ballot (2015) (Aug. 12, 2015), http://goo.gl/EYr1fb. 
28 Id. 
29 Pew Research Center, In Debate Over Legalizing Marijuana, Disagreement Over 
Drug’s Dangers, In Their Own Words: Supporters and Opponents of Legalization, (2015). 
30 See infra notes 71-74. 
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precedent that more law enforcement officers and state agencies are likely 
to follow in order to safeguard precious water supplies.  Even well-
established water rights in the agricultural sector have been cut and re-
negotiated,31 and marijuana producers joining the regulatory fray will need 
to navigate the various idiosyncrasies of centuries-old water laws to 
maximize their allocations.  States are likely to place increased scrutiny on 
producers who choose to grow or irrigate outside of legal channels.   
These broad conclusions stem from a systematic analysis that addresses 
the gap in understanding the relationship between water rights and 
marijuana legalization.  Section II begins by describing status quo 
marijuana production taking place outside the context of state water law 
doctrines.  While marijuana can be grown sustainably, unregulated 
production often leads to illegal and destructive water practices affecting 
downstream rights holders.   
Sections III and IV envision a legal marijuana market governed by the 
predominant doctrines of US water law: prior appropriation and 
riparianism.  Each system presents a unique set of legal and regulatory 
challenges, and for states like Colorado, these challenges are already 
evident.  In the American West, prior appropriation states will need to adapt 
to the relatively rigid nature of priority water rights, as well as the federal 
government’s outsized role in water allocation and marijuana prohibition.  
States employing riparianism or regulated riparianism will have a slightly 
easier time incorporating marijuana cultivation into existing systems, as 
long as the doctrinal or regulated administration of water rights is 
holistically applied to the legal marijuana industry.   
In Section V the theoretical becomes reality.  California’s uniquely 
mixed system of riparian and appropriative rights provides a number of 
opportunities for marijuana cultivators to come into compliance with water 
laws.  However, the state’s decentralized and haphazard approach to 
marijuana regulation creates uncertainty in the marijuana industry. That 
uncertainty bleeds into the administration of water rights despite the 
intentions of both cultivators and regulators. 
Section VI concludes with recommendations for states in the process of 
legalization.  By applying water laws to the emerging legal marijuana 
industry, this study identifies a number of key trade-offs states must make 
in reconciling marijuana cultivation with water scarcity.  This section 
considers the costs and benefits of decentralization, restrictive cultivation 
licensing, and the “no action alternative.”  While water laws will 
occasionally clash with the new marijuana economy, this Article identifies 
opportunities to smooth the transition. 
                                                 
31 Ryan Stoa, Regulating the Drought in California, Ctd., (2015) (Aug. 12, 2015), 
http://ryanstoa.com/blog/2015/6/1/regulating-the-drought-in-california-ctd. 
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II.  WEED AND WATER LAW: HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
 
A.  Historical Origins of Weed and Water Laws in the United States 
The vital importance of water for human survival, especially for 
drinking and crop production, necessitated rules establishing rights to water 
in times of scarcity for the earliest human civilizations, from hunter 
gatherers to the first agriculturalists.32  In some cases, these rules may have 
predated property laws for land.33  Jewish water laws can be traced as far 
back as 3000 BC,34 and are similarly prevalent in the earliest Islamic legal 
texts.35  English common law formed the baseline for water rights regimes 
in the early days of US sovereignty.36 The English “natural flow” doctrine 
prohibited landowners from making any use of water resources that would 
impair the quantity or quality of water flowing past riparian lands, with the 
exception that riparian landowners could use water for domestic purposes, 
such as drinking, washing, livestock rearing, or small-scale farming.37 
Eventually states would recognize the limitations on development of the 
natural flow doctrine,38 and two water law regimes were created to facilitate 
water use.  In states east of the Mississippi River, jurisdictions established 
the doctrine of riparianism, in which a “reasonable use” of water is 
permitted on lands riparian to a watercourse.39  As with the English 
common law, domestic uses are given priority.40  Lands west of the 
Mississippi River had a rockier transition, shifting initially from communal 
resource regimes of the Native Americans and Spanish settlers to traditional 
riparianism in step with eastern states,41 before adopting the doctrine of 
                                                 
32 Ryan Stoa, Droughts, Floods, and Wildfires: Paleo Perspectives on Disaster Law in 
the Anthropocene, 27 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 393 (2015). 
33 James Salzman, Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water, 17 YALE JOURNAL OF 
LAW & THE HUMANITIES 94-121 (2006) citing Torsten Malmberg, Water, Rhythm and 
Territoriality, 66 GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER. SERIES B, HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 73,76 (1984). 
34 Id. citing Melanne Andromecca Civic, A Comparative Analysis of the Israeli and 
Arab Water Law Traditions and Insights for Modern Water Sharing Agreement, 26 DENV. 
J. INT’T L. & POL’Y. 437 (1998). 
35 Id. 
36 BARTON THOMPSON JR. ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 55 (5th ed. 
2012). 
37 Id. citing Merritt v. Parker, 1 N.J.L. 526 (N.J. 1795) (“when a man purchases a 
piece of land through which a natural water-course flows, he has a right to make use of it, 
in its natural state, but not to stop or divert it to the prejudice of another.”). 
38 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in 
American Law 1780-1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 248 (1973). 
39 See, e.g., Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (D.R.I. 1827) (in which Justice Story 
required that riparians be allowed a reasonable use of water). 
40 Thompson, supra note 36, at 33. 
41 Thompson, supra note 36, at 188-190.  See also ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW 
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prior appropriation.  Originally developed by gold rush miners, prior 
appropriation creates a temporal right to water: “first in time, first in 
right.”42  The domestic use priority of riparianism was abandoned, replaced 
instead with the requirement that water be continually put to beneficial 
use.43  Today states east and west of the Mississippi River implement their 
own models of these traditional water law doctrines through administrative 
agencies and regulatory systems. 
Marijuana enjoys a similarly storied history.  One of humanity’s oldest 
cultivated crops, marijuana can be traced back 12,000 years to hunter 
gatherers who appreciated its nutritious and psychoactive properties.44 In 
Neolithic times it traveled from its roots in China and Siberia along the Silk 
Road to the Middle East and Europe.45  Once there it flourished in classical 
Greek, Roman, and Arab societies.46  European colonialism cemented 
marijuana as a global commodity, spreading its cultivation, trade, and use 
throughout the Western Hemisphere and into what is now the United 
States.47 
Marijuana in the United States was for many years overshadowed by the 
other major derivative of its taxonomic species cannabis sativa: hemp.48  
While marijuana is primarily grown and used for its medicinal or 
recreational psychoactive properties, hemp strains are grown to produce 
food, textiles, paper, and other materials.49  Queen Elizabeth required large 
                                                                                                                            
RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS (Nebraska Press 1st ed. 1983). 
42 Dunbar, supra note 41, at 61. 
43 Thompson, supra note 36, at 190-191. 
44 Barney Warf, High Points: An Historical Geography of Cannabis, 104 
GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 419 (2014) citing ERNEST L. ABEL, MARIHUANA: THE FIRST 
TWELVE THOUSAND YEARS (Plenum Press 1st ed. 1980). 
45 Id. at 420. 
46 Id. citing JAMES L. BUTRICA, THE MEDICAL USE OF CANNABIS AMONG THE GREEKS 
AND ROMANS (Hawthorn 1st ed. 2006); D.C.A. HILLMAN PH.D., THE CHEMICAL MUSE 
(Thomas Dunne Books 1st ed. 2008); ERNEST L. ABEL, MARIHUANA: THE FIRST TWELVE 
THOUSAND YEARS (Plenum Press 1st ed. 1980); FRANZ ROSENTHAL, THE HERB: HASHISH 
VERSUS MEDIEVAL MUSLIM SOCIETY (Brill Press 1st ed. 1971). 
47 Id. at 425-426 citing WILLIAM PARTRIDGE, CANNABIS AND CULTURAL GROUPS IN A 
COLOMBIAN MUNICIPIO (Mouton Publishers 1st ed. 1975); JOHNATHAN GREEN, CANNABIS 
(Thunder’s Mouth Press 1st ed. 2002); JAMES H. MILLS, CANNABIS IN COLONIAL INDIA: 
PRODUCTION, STATE INTERVENTION, AND RESISTANCE IN THE LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
BENGALI LANDSCAPE (Oxford University Press 1st ed. 2005). 
48 For a review of the taxonomy of marijuana and hemp, see generally, Ernest Small & 
Arthur Cronquist, A Practical and Natural Taxonomy for Cannabis, 25 TAXON 405 (1976); 
and Shannon L. Datwyler Ph.D. & George D. Weiblen Ph.D., Genetic Variation in Hemp 
and Marijuana (Cannabis sativa L.) According to Amplified Fragment Length 
Polymorphisms, 51 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 371 (2006). 
49 See generally, ROWAN ROBINSON, THE GREAT BOOK OF HEMP: THE COMPLETE 
GUIDE TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL, COMMERCIAL, AND MEDICINAL USES OF THE WORLD’S 
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landowners throughout the British Empire to grow hemp to counter 
Britain’s reliance on Russian hemp imports;50 later the Jamestown colonists 
would be required to do the same.51  Both George Washington and Thomas 
Jefferson were hemp growers, and the Constitution of the United States was 
written on hemp.52  John Adams was a prominent supporter of hemp 
cultivation, writing frequently about its benefits.53  “Seems to me if grate 
Men dont leeve off writing Pollyticks, breaking Heads, boxing Ears, ringing 
Noses and kicking Breeches, we shall by and by want a world of Hemp 
more for our own consumshon,” Adams wrote.54   
Hemp and marijuana would continue to be grown throughout the 19th 
and early 20th centuries.55  Like any other legal agricultural commodity, 
marijuana would have been subject to variations in state water law doctrines 
concerning agriculture.  In eastern jurisdictions, for example, marijuana 
cultivation would have been permitted as long as it was reasonable vis a vis 
other riparians.56  In small quantities, marijuana farming could have 
qualified as a protected domestic use.  The fact that a water rights dispute 
before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1852 involved a contractual 
obligation to use water solely for certain purposes that included a hemp-mill  
was found unremarkable by the court.57   
In western states, marijuana cultivation – perceived as agriculture – 
would have met the requirements of beneficial use, thereby vesting 
temporal water rights.  An early Colorado case establishing the prior 
appropriation doctrine noted that “the doctrine of priority of right by 
priority of appropriation for agriculture is evoked, as we have seen, by the 
imperative necessity for artificial irrigation of the soil.”58  In 1947, a 
California tax dispute involved the development of wells for purposes of 
irrigating hemp.59  The court thought the plan could “prove a profitable 
industry,” before moving on to the legal matter at issue.60  
                                                                                                                            
MOST EXTRAORDINARY PLANT (Park Street Press, 1st ed. 1996). 
50 Warf, supra note 44, at 426. 
51 MARTIN A. LEE, SMOKE SIGNALS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MARIJUANA – MEDICAL, 
RECREATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC 14 (Scribner, 1st ed. 2012). 
52 Id. 
53 Corliss Knapp Engle, John Adams, Farmer and Gardner, 61 ARNOLDIA 10 (2002). 
54 John Adams, writing as "Humphrey Ploughjogger", in the Boston Evening Post, 
June 20, 1763, MASS. HISTORY SOC’Y, BOSTON. 
55 By some accounts, it became the third largest cash crop in the United States by the 
mid-19th century.  Lee, supra note 51, at 17. 
56 E.g., Hendrick v. Cook, 4 Ga. 241, 256 (1848) (“Each riparian proprietor is entitled 
to a reasonable use of the water, for domestic, agricultural and manufacturing purposes”). 
57 Washabaugh v. Oyster, 18 Pa. 497 (1852). 
58 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882). 
59 Lerdo Land Co. v. Commissioner, 1947 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 16 (Tex. 1947). 
60 Id. at 7. 
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The widespread use of both hemp and marijuana in the United States 
catalyzed opposition to cannabis sativa’s legality from multiple angles.  On 
the one hand, marijuana’s early popularity with immigrants and bohemian 
communities produced reactionary prejudices that prompted crude public 
campaigns to criminalize the drug.61  On the other hand, hemp’s industrial 
versatility was a threat to the cotton industry and other producers of 
textiles.62  Despite strong support in the medical and pharmaceutical 
industries, twenty-nine states banned cannabis between 1915-1931.63  The 
federal government then passed the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, creating 
barriers to marijuana production, sale, and consumption.64  The Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Leary v. United States overturned the Marihuana Tax Act 
on the grounds that compliance would violate a person’s right against self-
incrimination.65  The decision prompted Congress to repeal the Act and 
replace it with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 
of 1970, which categorized marijuana as a Schedule I narcotic with 
prohibitions on cultivation, sale, possession, and use.66  Marijuana has been 
a black market crop ever since. 
 
B.  Weed and Water on the Black Market 
Because states developed modern regulatory regimes for managing 
water rights in the latter half of the twentieth century,67 after marijuana was 
criminalized, those regimes have never regulated the marijuana industry.  If 
they had there is little reason to believe marijuana cultivation would have 
been any more challenging than the regulation of other crops.  Regulation 
by federal agencies like the Food and Drug Administration68 and the 
Department of Agriculture69 would have been likely, while states may or 
                                                 
61 Warf, supra note 44, at 429.  See also, the 1936 film “Reefer Madness,” which 
depicted the graphic horrors of marijuana use in ways that would appear satirical today.   
62 Warf, supra note 44, at 429. 
63 Collin B. Walsh & Daniel T. Nau, The History, Law, and Psychology of 
Criminalizing Marijuana: A Comparative Analysis with Alcohol and Tobacco, 274 
INDIANA LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 19 (2013). 
64 Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937). 
65 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). 
66 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970); see also Walsh, supra note 63, at 23. 
67 See, e.g., Ryan Stoa, Florida Water Management Districts and the Florida Water 
Resources Act: The Challenges of Basin-Level Management, 7 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & 
NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 73 (2015). 
68 The FDA regulates prescription and pharmaceutical drugs, among other products 
affecting public health.  See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. 
No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). 
69 The USDA provides “leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, rural 
development, nutrition, and related issues based on sound public policy, the best available 
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may not have developed marijuana-specific water allocation policies.70  
Preliminary marijuana  legalization initiatives have forced water 
management agencies to consider the marijuana industry anew, but those 
efforts remain limited.  In order to determine how marijuana will fit into 
modern water law regimes, it is necessary to understand how the marijuana 
industry has evolved on the black market, and how its evolution has 
impacted water resources. 
The size of the marijuana industry today, like any rooted in the black 
market, is notoriously difficult to estimate, and lacking in peer-reviewed 
research.  A 2006 pro-marijuana study focused on valuation pegged the 
total value of domestic marijuana production at $35.8 billion, based on an 
estimate of over 56 million plants grown annually.71  If accurate, the figures 
would make marijuana the largest cash crop in the United States, and a top 
five cash crop in 39 states.72  In 2012 a generalist book on legalization 
questioned those results, claiming the industry production value is closer to 
$4.3 billion.73  A 2015 study on the nascent legal marijuana market was 
more bullish, finding annual sales of legal products topping $2.7 billion and 
growth outpacing any other industry.74  
While the precise size of the marijuana industry may be an elusive 
figure, even low estimates make clear that the transition from black market 
to legalized and regulated production will transfer a burgeoning agricultural 
commodity into regulatory systems.  At least initially, this transfer may not 
occur all at once.  Aggressive taxation of producers and consumers of 
marijuana may keep less expensive black market opportunities alive and 
well.75 In Colorado’s legal marijuana market, an estimated 40% of 
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consumers still purchase marijuana on the black market, likely due to lower 
prices.76  While that may be a disappointment to law enforcement and tax 
revenue authorities, administrative agencies regulating water resources may 
benefit from a gradual transition to legalization.  On the other hand, if 
obtaining water use permits is perceived to be excessively onerous by 
producers, water regulations may themselves contribute to the perpetuation 
of the black market.  What evidence exists on the relationship between 
black market marijuana production and water use suggests that sustainable 
water resources management is more likely in a legal, regulated 
environment. 
Marijuana can be grown in many different ways, in many different 
places, under many different growing conditions.  It can be grown indoors 
or outdoors, in arid or humid climates, with rain-fed or irrigated water.77  
Cultivation sites range from one or two plants grown for personal use, to 
small-scale farms, to large-scale grows on public lands.  Because the 
marijuana industry is so fragmented and diverse, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions about marijuana and water use.  Water’s complex hydrological 
characteristics compound this challenge.78   
The aforementioned 2015 Eel River watershed study started with the 
assumption that one marijuana plant consumes six gallons of water per day 
during the growing season, but acknowledged that estimates vary widely, 
from as little as 1 to as many as 15 gallons per day.79  The differences for 
purposes of water management are substantial when extrapolated over time 
and frequency.  Using the six gallon/day estimate, Bauer found that in 
several river systems the demand for water to irrigate marijuana plants was 
greater than the supply of water during the lowest periods of flow (which 
usually coincide with the peak of the growing season).80   If accurate, the 
reduced flows would have severe consequences on endangered species, 
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riverine ecosystems, and downstream water rights holders.81  The National 
Marine Fisheries Service’s recovery plan for the Coho salmon in Oregon 
and California pegs marijuana cultivation as a threat to the salmon’s 
survival due to reduced river flows, though again little data exists to draw 
firm conclusions.82  A 2013 study on wildlife mortality found a link 
between rodenticide found in dead mammals and the density of nearby 
marijuana farms, suggesting that pesticides and fertilizers may be seeping 
into the broader environment, including water resources.83  And the 
deforestation, land terracing, and road building associated with large 
marijuana grows contributes to erosion and sediment loading of streams, 
according to a 2012 study of western public lands.84  Despite these 
preliminary studies, the leading scientists on the issue have observed the 
non-existence of research on the marijuana-environment nexus and called 
for more attention to the issue.85 
My own discussions with marijuana farmers in northern California 
revealed significant variation in water use practices, with several 
questioning the six gallons/day assumption.86  Colorado’s guidelines for 
marijuana farmers estimates that each plant consumes only 0.25 
gallons/day.87  Hezekiah Allen, the individual responsible for putting the six 
gallon/day figure into public discourse, has since clarified that plants 
typically require only one gallon/day.88  That figure would make marijuana 
one of the least water-intensive agricultural products.  One of the challenges 
presented by marijuana prohibition is that farmers are reticent to participate 
in scientific studies common for other crops.89  One global-scale study of 
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water footprints found hempseed to have a low demand for water compared 
to similar plants,90 but the literature on marijuana strains remains 
undeveloped. 
Statistical uncertainties notwithstanding, there is ample anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that unregulated marijuana production can lead to 
unsustainable water use.  For the most part, the worst water practices are 
taking place on large growing operations that far exceed the limits of most 
states’ personal or medicinal cultivation allowances.  In April 2015 
authorities in central California seized 12,000 plants from a private 
operation making illegal withdrawals of groundwater.91  Most legal water 
users in the region were facing cutbacks in water allocations, many as much 
as 36%.92  In July 2015 Sacramento County officials seized 900 plants from 
property drawing water from an illegal streambed alteration.93  A week later 
the county declared marijuana cultivation in excess of legal limits a 
violation of wastewater regulations.94  Municipal water violations and leaks 
have been a frequent gateway into police raids of indoor marijuana grows 
across the country.95  What could be the largest marijuana bust in Texas 
history took place on property with highly sophisticated irrigation 
systems.96  Routine marijuana raids now frequently report abusive water 
practices untethered to any water rights.97   At a California Senate hearing 
in July 2015, Senator Mike McGuire stated his belief that while most 
marijuana farmers want regulation, egregious violators are responsible for 
water diversions “sucking rivers dry.”98 
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The inability of state water laws to adequately regulate the marijuana 
industry – because they are either undeveloped or in a state where marijuana 
production remains an entirely illegal activity – is a detriment to the 
otherwise law-abiding marijuana farming community.  Marijuana farming 
groups claim the newfound concern for water violations has led to small-
scale operations being swept into the water-raid campaigns.99  One pending 
case claims $600,000 in penalties for water violations.100  In 2010 
Mendocino County, California created a permitting program in which 
marijuana farmers paid permitting and administrative fees to finance county 
monitoring and compliance.101  In exchange the farmers were deemed legal 
and compliant with, among others, environmental and water resource 
laws.102   The pilot program raised almost $1 million in two years through 
the participation of more than 90 farmers, but a federal probe and grand jury 
subpoenas shut down the program and disclosed the identities of the 
participants.103  A legislator at the California Senate hearing succinctly 
stated the impact heavy-handed or inconsistent regulatory enforcement 
would have on the marijuana industry: “[Y]ou have to be careful. An 
industry that’s been in the shadows and then is hit with a heavy regulatory 
burden may go further underground.”104  My own discussions with 
marijuana farmers in the region largely support the proposition that legal 
water regulation is desirable but remains elusive.105  To some, water permits 
represent a prestigious mark of legitimacy, and the lack of direction from 
state water laws creates uncertainty and a reliance on improvised irrigation 
schemes.106 
Adopting water policies that promote sustainable use of resources while 
bringing marijuana producers into the fold remains a necessary task for both 
water regulators and the marijuana legalization movement.  In June 2015 
leading scientists published an article in Biosciences with an appeal to the 
law and policy community:107 
we argue here that (a) the environmental harm caused by marijuana 
cultivation in both the semi-legal and black-market context is significant and 
merits a direct policy response, (b) current approaches to and funding for 
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governing the environmental effects are inadequate, and (c) neglecting 
discussion of the environmental impacts of cultivation when shaping future 
marijuana-use and -possession policies represents a missed opportunity to 
reduce, regulate, and mitigate environmental harm. 
In the following sections, traditional doctrines of water law and their 
regulatory systems are analyzed in order to capitalize on opportunities to 
regulate the marijuana industry in the interests of sound water resources 
management. 
 
III.  PRIOR APPROPRIATION 
 
The first application for a water permit to cultivate recreational 
marijuana may have originated on the banks of the Roaring Fork River in 
western Colorado.  There, in August 2014, High Valley Farms, LLC 
submitted an application to withdraw water for purposes of cultivating a 
37,500 foot marijuana greenhouse.108  Colorado became the first state to 
adopt a pure prior appropriation doctrine when Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch 
Co. abolished riparian rights in 1882.109  Since then, water rights have been 
adjudicated according to temporal priority, as well as a determination that 
the appropriation is “beneficial.”110  Colorado statute further defines 
beneficial use: “that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate 
under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the 
purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made.”111 
The problem for High Valley Farms is that marijuana cultivation -- 
while lawful in Colorado -- remains unlawfully made under federal law.112  
The application thus posed a dilemma to Colorado’s Division of Water 
Resources, tasked with reviewing the application: can it be legal to grow 
marijuana plants in Colorado, but illegal to water them?  The agency threw 
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the question back to High Valley Farms,113 and the case is ongoing.114  For 
the rest of the state’s marijuana farmers, water has been obtained through 
existing water rights, or leased from rights holders with existing water 
rights.  While this is the first time an application has been submitted to 
cultivate marijuana with a new water right,115 it almost certainly will not be 
the last.  
Prior appropriation doctrine is followed in most states west of the 
Mississippi River,116 including states (i.e., Colorado, Oregon, Alaska) now 
grappling with marijuana legalization.  Much of the American West is arid 
and unfriendly to irrigated agriculture,117 but the region also contains 
remote landscapes with a culture rooted in individual freedoms and the 
sanctity of private property, a recipe that has fostered marijuana cultivation 
for decades.118   In this section on marijuana and the doctrine of prior 
appropriation, three questions are explored: 1) how can the marijuana 
industry be integrated with water markets and existing water rights 
regimes?; 2) how will the federal government’s marijuana prohibition 
policies impede the development of western water rights?; and 3) what can 
Colorado’s trailblazing experience with marijuana legalization teach other 
prior appropriation states about their water regulation frameworks?  
 
A.  Marijuana’s Impact on Western Water Markets 
The prior appropriation doctrine as classically applied is relatively 
straightforward.  A water right is obtained by taking surface water and 
applying it to a “beneficial use.”119  As the High Valley Farms case 
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illustrates, beneficial use is a broad term within which a variety of 
interpretations can be extracted, but typically the term implies that a water 
right must meet a certain threshold of productivity and efficiency.  If that 
threshold is met, the place of diversion or use is of no import.120  Once the 
water right is obtained, priority between users is predicated on seniority.121  
Traditionally this means that prior appropriation jurisdictions do not invoke 
equity to reduce appropriations pro-rata when water is scarce.  Instead, the 
most senior rights holders are entitled to their entire share of water, while 
junior rights holders receive only what is leftover.  The concept is embodied 
in the expression “first in time, first in right.”122  The common law doctrine 
of “abandonment” ensures that if a rights holder no longer uses their water 
allocation, the right itself is lost or forfeited.123  If the waters of a 
watercourse are completely allocated, or if a junior water right is not 
sufficient for a given purpose, one can purchase a water right  or land on 
which a property right to water has vested.124 
If the legal marijuana industry were to enter this traditional conception 
of prior appropriation, it is very likely that many marijuana farmers would 
remain on the black market by virtue of the priority afforded to senior rights 
holders.  Many marijuana farms today are located on properties that lack 
established water rights.125  Many of these farms are also located in 
watersheds experiencing high levels of water scarcity.126  Those factors 
make it unlikely that junior water rights would provide sufficient water to 
grow marijuana, if they provide water at all.  For these farmers to acquire a 
sufficient water right it would need to be purchased from another water 
rights holder.  Although the cost of doing so varies by jurisdiction, water 
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rights can be prohibitively expensive.  In 2006 the town of Prescott Valley, 
Arizona sold effluent-based water rights at auction for $24,650/acre-foot 
($19.98/meter3).127  Water rights are not always so expensive,128 but with 
droughts plaguing much of the American West, the costs of obtaining water 
rights are increasing.129  Marijuana farms in operation today without water 
rights may find it easier to remain on the black market (and make illegal 
water diversions) than pay the market price for water. 
Existing water rights holders with an eye toward the legal marijuana 
market might have had an easier time with traditional applications of the 
prior appropriation doctrine.  Agriculture has long qualified as a beneficial 
use in western states,130 while farmers can and do modify which crops are 
grown with their scarce water allocations.131  While the federal marijuana 
prohibition may complicate beneficial use determinations for states like 
Colorado, other states have more ambiguous definitions of beneficial use 
that could facilitate a smooth transition to marijuana cultivation for existing 
rights holders.132   
In reality the traditional prior appropriation model has long been 
transformed by the rise of the administrative regulation of water 
resources.133  Prior appropriation remains a default rule in small-scale 
disputes and a guiding principle in large-scale water management planning, 
but the doctrine’s lasting power is that it represents the worst-case scenario 
when stakeholders are negotiating complex allocation schemes.134  The 
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doctrine served as the backdrop to negotiations that eventually created 
Idaho’s Snake River Water Rights Agreement,135 for example, or the 
Southern Nevada Water Authority.136   
Prior appropriation’s evolution is particularly meaningful in two 
respects.  First, strict enforcement of priority between users has been 
loosened, with agencies finding other ways to manage expectations and 
reduce risks in ways that are less costly or reactive than the common law.137  
Second, agencies manage groundwater distinctly from surface water in 
many jurisdictions.  While this was originally due to scientific ignorance,138 
the flexibility of groundwater doctrines allows agencies to accommodate 
new water users, particularly in the agricultural sector.139  Groundwater is 
now the primary source of irrigation water in Kansas, Oklahoma, Nebraska, 
Texas, and South Dakota, and collectively the American West is 
responsible for two-thirds of groundwater irrigation withdrawals in the 
United States.140 
The transition to administrative regulation of appropriative rights has 
implications for the regulation of legal marijuana.  In some ways the 
flexibility of modern regulatory systems will create opportunities for 
agencies to incorporate the marijuana industry.  The common law doctrine 
of prior appropriation presents a barrier to entry for prospective entrants to 
water rights markets, a group many marijuana farmers currently belong 
to.141  If administrative agencies can usher black market cultivators into the 
regulatory system, it will be easier to monitor water use and reduce water 
stress created by illegal water diversions.  In addition, adjudicating water 
rights disputes through judicial decisions might be confusing in light of 
contradictory state-federal positions regarding marijuana legalization, 
leading to inconsistent applications of water doctrine with little precedential 
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value.  Administrative agencies can set policies specific to the marijuana 
industry, and address potential conflicts proactively.  Administrative 
regulation of water rights may liberate states to experiment with policies 
that promote marijuana cultivation in certain regions, seasons, or 
methodologies so as to promote efficiency and flexibility in water use.142  
Some of these policies are proposed in Section VI below. 
On the other hand, the administrative regulation of water rights in prior 
appropriation states may lead to perverse results.  Prior appropriation 
doctrine was developed, after all, in regions where small-scale irrigated 
farms (characteristic of marijuana farms) needed an efficient allocation 
scheme.143  It is possible that state regulatory systems will go too far to 
accommodate the marijuana industry, or conversely, impose restrictions that 
are incompatible with the industry.  Recent cases in Washington and New 
Mexico, for example, have made it easier to obtain water rights to the point 
that the sustainability of the resource may be compromised.144  Already 
some states appear to be granting fairly permissive permissions for 
marijuana cultivators to use water resources.  In Washington, for example, 
marijuana cultivation is not expected to require any water permits.  The 
state provides water permit exemptions for commercial activities using up 
to 5,000 gallons/day,145 enough to accommodate the cultivation of between 
900-10,000 plants.146  The state anticipates that all legal marijuana farms 
will fall within these limits.147  In addition, rainwater and unused 
groundwater can be stored for use during the growing season.148  In 
Colorado preliminary guidelines are more severe.  Marijuana cultivation for 
personal use is allowed under household well permits, but only if the plants 
are grown indoors, a restriction that may be difficult to enforce.149  In 
addition, Colorado’s existing irrigation permits (which can be used to 
supply water to commercial marijuana grows) often have seasonal water use 
restrictions that would preclude year-round cultivation of marijuana.150   
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The evolution of the doctrine of prior appropriation provides 
administrative agencies in the American West with new tools to usher in the 
legal marijuana industry.  But the departure from doctrine also places more 
responsibility on agencies to adapt to marijuana legalization, as current 
water systems are predicated on negotiating cooperative management 
schemes that work for the parties involved.  If marijuana farmers face 
unreasonable water restrictions, a return to the black market will become 
more enticing.  On the other hand, excessively permissive allocations for 
marijuana cultivation may risk creating unsustainable expectations of water 
availability, especially at a time when scientific understanding of the 
relationship between marijuana and water is so undeveloped.  States will 
need to innovate to balance these dynamics, and even then, the federal 
government’s marijuana prohibition will continue to frustrate reform. 
 
 
B.  Federal Marijuana Prohibition and Western Water Policy 
The federal government has played an outsized role in the development 
of the American West for centuries.  Shortly after independence, Congress 
sent surveyors to western lands to document the vast region’s potential.151  
After securing land from foreign governments and tribes, the Homestead 
Act of 1862 ignited western migration by granting land to settlers at 
minimal cost.152  Shortly afterwards, the federal government realized that in 
order to reap the full economic rewards of western expansion, agricultural 
development would require federal involvement in building dams, 
reservoirs, and irrigation systems.153  That led to the Reclamation Act of 
1902, which dedicated federal funds toward the “construction and 
maintenance of irrigation works for the storage, diversion, and development 
of waters for the reclamation of arid and semiarid lands” in western states 
and territories,154 states that traditionally followed the doctrine of prior 
appropriation.  The Bureau of Reclamation would expand its mandate to 
include energy production, navigation, flood control, and municipal water 
supply,155 missions the Bureau still carries out to this day.  Despite 
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operating in only seventeen states in the American West, the Bureau is the 
largest wholesale water supplier in the United States.156  It provides 
irrigation water to one-fifth of western farmers, and municipal, residential, 
and industrial water to 31 million people.157  
The federal government’s involvement in western water development is 
not limited to constructing hydrologic infrastructure, however.   By creating 
large-scale reservoirs and irrigation schemes that supplied water more 
consistently, the Bureau of Reclamation secured water rights in a way that 
reactive litigation invoking doctrinal water laws could not.158  As long as 
the federal government does not disrupt those rights, it retains the flexibility 
to manage water resources through a variety of approaches.159  In principle, 
the federal government’s water management flexibility could provide water 
regulators in prior appropriation states with a powerful partner with which 
to adapt to the influx of marijuana cultivators without disrupting existing 
rights-holders. 
In practice, the Bureau of Reclamation has not been cooperative to 
states legalizing marijuana cultivation.  In May of 2014, the Bureau 
announced that it would not allow water supplies or facilities it controls to 
be used for purposes of cultivating marijuana.160  That includes the 475 
dams, 337 reservoirs, and 8,116 miles of irrigation canals it controls, and 
the water those facilities supply.161  The prohibition has confused water 
rights holders throughout prior appropriation jurisdictions.  The Bureau of 
Reclamation provides water to two-thirds of Washington’s irrigated lands, 
for example, where recreational and medicinal marijuana cultivation has 
been legal since 2012.162  But it’s not clear how farmers growing multiple 
crops on those lands would be regulated if one of those crops is marijuana.  
Said one state manager for the Roza Irrigation District, “these kinds of 
details have not been fleshed out.”163  The state’s regulatory agency with 
primary jurisdiction over marijuana claims that it would be impossible to 
determine how many marijuana farmers are using Bureau of Reclamation 
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waters.164 
The Bureau of Reclamation provides water to even more lands in 
Colorado,165 where regulators are similarly confused.  One water supplier 
insisted that its water supplies could not be interfered with despite having to 
pass through a Bureau of Reclamation dam facility.166  By contrast, a water 
district in the same area imposed a moratorium on marijuana irrigation in 
reaction to the federal policy, before lifting the moratorium despite the 
policy.167   
The federal government’s involvement in western water law implicates 
the broader jurisdictional battle between the states and federal government 
over marijuana legalization.168  In this case, the Bureau of Reclamation’s 
policy applies insofar as it reports violations to the US Department of 
Justice, whose attorneys are responsible for using prosecutorial discretion to 
determine if violations merit legal action on behalf of the federal 
government.169  The Justice Department, in providing guidance regarding 
enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act to its attorneys, has 
articulated a policy that is focused on prosecuting the more criminal 
elements of marijuana cultivation, such as sale to minors, interstate 
distribution, and cultivation on public lands.170  It is not clear if violations 
of the Bureau of Reclamation’s policy on marijuana irrigation would 
constitute such an enforcement priority.171 
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Even if they do, the legislative branch of the federal government may 
limit the executive’s ability to enforce the Bureau of Reclamation policy.  A 
federal law passed in December 2014 prohibited the Department of Justice 
from using federal funds to interfere with state implementation of medical 
marijuana laws.172  The law was intended to prohibit federal prosecutors 
from pursuing medical marijuana patients, providers, and regulators,173 but 
the Department of Justice interpreted the provision to prohibit federal 
prosecutors from pursuing only state officials, claims implicating state laws, 
or the state itself.174  The interpretational dispute is currently before the 9th 
Circuit Court of Appeals,175 though even if the Department of Justice’s 
narrow reading is correct, the law may effectively limit the federal 
government’s enforcement of Bureau of Reclamation policy because many 
water suppliers that contract with the Bureau are state agencies or political 
subdivisions of state governments.  Washington’s irrigation districts,176 for 
example, could not be prosecuted for providing Bureau of Reclamation 
water to farmers cultivating marijuana for medical purposes.  The same is 
true for irrigation districts and other public agencies contracting with the 
Bureau in Arizona, California, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and 
Utah.177 
The Department of Justice’s interpretation also concedes that its 
prosecutors would likely be barred from taking legal action against state 
officials who violate the CSA by taking regulatory actions such as issuing 
permits.178  In this case, that likely absolves water agencies from federal 
prosecutions arising from the issuance or renewal of permits, even if the 
state agency permits water allocations that are supplied or facilitated by the 
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Bureau of Reclamation.  Non-state entities, such as marijuana farmers or 
private water suppliers, would still be vulnerable to federal prosecution, but 
to date the Department of Justice does not appear to be prioritizing 
enforcement of the Bureau of Reclamation’s marijuana prohibition policy.   
Of course, the Bureau would still be within its rights to use its own 
influence to affect marijuana irrigation.  The Bureau works with state 
officials to construct, maintain, and operate large-scale hydrological 
projects.  As such, its authority is sufficiently broad that policy preferences 
can be accommodated into management decisions.179  In negotiating 
contracts and payment schemes with irrigation districts,180 the Bureau could 
leverage its authority to require that districts prohibit irrigation of 
marijuana.  Dictating to states what crops they should or should not grow 
would be unusual for the Bureau of Reclamation, but does not appear to be 
out of line with the agency’s federal powers.  Regardless of how stringently 
the Bureau enforces its own marijuana prohibition policy, the mere 
articulation of it may be leading water providers to question the legality of 
permitting federal water withdrawals for purposes of marijuana cultivation.  
That was the case for High Valley Farm’s application review, where the 
state appeared to interpret the Bureau’s policy as prohibiting issuance of a 
permit that depended on federal waters, but allowing a permit that depended 
only on non-federal waters.181 
As water resources in the American West have shifted from being 
governed by prior appropriation doctrine to state and federal administrative 
regulation, the federal government’s role in setting water policy in prior 
appropriation states has grown.  This is true for marijuana cultivation as 
well, where the Bureau of Reclamation’s marijuana irrigation prohibition 
threatens to undermine state efforts to regulate the marijuana industry’s 
water use.  In the future, however, the Bureau’s role will also present an 
opportunity for the American West to adapt to the legal marijuana industry 
in an integrated manner by facilitating regulation of marijuana irrigation on 
the watershed level. 
 
C.  The Colorado Experiment 
Two prior appropriation states – Washington and Colorado – were the 
first to legalize the recreational use of marijuana.  Of the two, Colorado’s 
marijuana economy is much further developed.182  In addition, Colorado 
remains the strictest adherent to traditional conceptions of the prior 
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appropriation doctrine.183  As a result, the state provides a useful case study 
of the growing pains that prior appropriation states can expect to face when 
regulating legal marijuana.   
Colorado voters approved Amendment 64 in November, 2012, 
legalizing the recreational use of marijuana.184  Because legalization was 
promulgated by referendum, state officials (many of whom opposed the 
amendment) did not have regulatory frameworks in place and were required 
to develop rules and regulations very quickly.185  The complex regulatory 
burden marijuana legalization would place on the state was anticipated by 
opponents of the amendment, who raised the issue in the months leading up 
to the election.186  To address the challenge the state created a task force to 
investigate legal and regulatory issues and to propose legislative and 
executive actions.187 The task force appropriately identified some 
environmental issues, such as the need to regulate pesticides and waste 
products, but water was never mentioned.188  Nonetheless, the task force’s 
recommendations were largely adopted by the state legislature and passed 
in May, 2013.189   
The laws allow for small-scale home cultivation without a license, 
licensed commercial cultivation under a tiered plant allowance system, and 
an option for local governments to add their own (potentially more 
restrictive) regulations.190  To ease the burden of monitoring and 
enforcement on state regulators, laws also mandated the “vertical 
integration” of marijuana production by requiring cultivators and retailers to 
grow/sell their own products.191  Finally, the state imposed a number of 
taxes on cultivators, retailers, and consumers.192  The laws did not address 
water rights, water permits, or water use regulations, presumably assuming 
that the state’s existing water law infrastructure would be sufficient to 
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handle any potential water issues. 
Predictably a number of challenges have emerged, including federal 
enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act and a lack of access to 
banking for marijuana businesses.193  Access to water has not been as 
prominently discussed, but has presented ongoing obstacles to state and 
local regulators.  The Bureau of Reclamation’s marijuana prohibition policy 
has been confusing to local governments tasked with determining if (or 
which of) their waters should be considered federal.194  Neither the state nor 
the federal government has issued guidelines to help local governments 
determine if their waters are part of the Bureau’s jurisdiction.  Nor has the 
state provided guidance on how local water authorities should approach 
marijuana cultivation.  Pueblo county has made its own determinations, 
setting aside water it has deemed non-federal for the cultivation of 
marijuana.195  It has since been proactive in issuing permits to cultivators, 
including a lease sale of 3.26 million gallons to a single operation in March, 
2015,196 despite acknowledging that the county has little data on marijuana 
cultivation’s water consumption patterns.197 
The High Valley Farms case demonstrates that the state is equally in the 
dark when it comes to creating new water rights for marijuana cultivators.  
Although the state has not been shy in pushing the boundaries of states 
rights and federal supremacy by legalizing marijuana,198 federal marijuana 
prohibition is still confusing the state’s interpretation of its own water laws.  
The state definition of “beneficial use” includes the requirement that the 
purpose of the appropriation is “lawfully made.”199  Neither the state nor 
one of its water courts has determined if the federal marijuana prohibition 
would render marijuana cultivation in Colorado an unlawful purpose with 
respect to the beneficial use requirement.  The issue has only been raised  
because High Valley Farms requested a new water right from the state, 
whereas some state officials have implied that marijuana cultivators with 
existing water rights, or who acquire existing water rights, would not face 
the same problem.200  This might be accurate from an administrative point 
of view, as the state’s water regulators are most active in making a 
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beneficial use determination at the time of application, and are unlikely to 
throw the marijuana industry into chaos by stripping marijuana cultivators 
of existing water rights.   
As a legal matter, however, Colorado water law does not differentiate 
between existing and prospective water rights with respect to the beneficial 
use requirement.201  Furthermore, state law prevents the sale or transfer of 
water rights to prospective appropriators that do not have a “legally vested 
interest” in the lands or facilities to be served by the appropriation.202  If 
marijuana cultivation is not a beneficial use because it is unlawfully made 
under federal law for water rights applicants, it is not a beneficial use for 
water rights holders or prospective buyers of those rights either.  The state’s 
Department of Water Resources acknowledges that obtaining new water 
rights may be close to impossible given water scarcity in the region,203 and 
this reality certainly places scrutiny on the water permit application process.  
Strictly speaking, however, a judicial determination that marijuana 
cultivation does not qualify as a beneficial use would apply to cultivators in 
every stage of the permit process, including existing rights holders, 
prospective buyers, and permit applicants, a ruling that could disrupt not 
only the marijuana industry but Colorado’s water rights system in general.  
Other prior appropriation states define beneficial use without expressly 
requiring the purpose of the use to be lawful,204 though it would not be a 
reach for courts to read the lawful purpose requirement into those 
definitions.205  A legislative amendment to clarify that marijuana cultivation 
is a beneficial use of the state’s water resources may become necessary for 
Colorado and other prior appropriation states to resolve the ambiguity.  
Other aspects of Colorado’s marijuana law framework do not directly 
address water rights but have indirect impacts on the resource.  While 
commercial outdoor cultivation is permitted, Colorado produces much of its 
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marijuana indoors, in warehouses, greenhouses, or private residences.206  
Personal marijuana cultivation must take place in an enclosed, locked 
space.207  There are justifications for these policies, such as ensuring that 
cultivation is not a public act where underage minors can access the plants.  
But growing marijuana indoors has significant environmental consequences 
as well.  Indoor grows consume vast quantities of electricity to power lights 
that mimic the sun’s photosynthetic energy.208 That energy is often 
provided by hydroelectric power that places demands on water resources 
and aquatic ecosystems.209  Several states in the American West receive the 
majority of their energy from hydroelectric dams,210 and increasing the 
demand on energy supplies as a result of indoor marijuana cultivation will 
have implications for water security throughout the region.211  While 
outdoor cultivation has its own environmental challenges,212 Colorado’s 
indoor growing policy is likely to increase the demand for energy and water 
resources. 
The pace with which Colorado’s marijuana regulations have developed 
has been ambitious, yet early reviews of the legal framework are generally 
positive.213  Stakeholder participation, holistic policy-making, and a 
willingness to innovate have been cited as reasons for the strong roll-out.214  
Unfortunately, the integrated nature of Colorado’s marijuana laws has yet to 
meaningfully consider environmental regulations, and in particular, the 
impacts that marijuana cultivation and state water laws have on each other.  
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Some local governments are taking matters into their own hands,215 and 
given the nascent state of the marijuana industry experimentation should not 
be discouraged.  But sooner or later the marijuana industry, as well as the 
legal framework for water resources, will benefit from a more proactive 
resolution of emerging ambiguities and uncertainties. 
 
IV.  RIPARIANISM 
 
Compared to the doctrine of prior appropriation, which gives priority to 
water users on the basis of seniority, the doctrine of riparianism allows 
water users to take water as long as the uses are reasonable.  The primary 
advantage of the riparian doctrine under common law is that it is more 
flexible than prior appropriation, adjusting to changing conditions on the 
basis of equity.  The disadvantage is that riparianism provides less security 
of right than a senior water user would have in a prior appropriation 
jurisdiction.  What both systems share is a modern reality in which 
administrative agencies have asserted themselves, providing a measure of 
flexibility to prior appropriation systems and a measure of security to 
riparian systems.  Nonetheless, the common law continues to form the basis 
for contemporary administration of water rights and permits in eastern 
states, and the components of a riparian water right have implications for 
marijuana cultivation, just as the marijuana industry will force some 
riparian jurisdictions to reexamine their water allocation systems.   
The aridity of the American West necessitated a strict allocation scheme 
that could provide investment security, a factor that gave rise to the prior 
appropriation doctrine.216  The relatively water-rich climates of the east, on 
the other hand, were able to maintain or slightly modify riparianism’s roots 
in the English common law. The English “natural flow” doctrine prohibited 
landowners from making any use of water resources that would impair the 
quantity or quality of water flowing past riparian lands,217  reflecting the 
English preference for using property for its aesthetic or personal 
qualities.218  Small-scale domestic uses provided an exception,219 an 
absolute right of priority that has been maintained and reaffirmed to this 
day.220   
The first evolution in eastern water law was a shift from natural flow 
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principles to a loose set of rules that enabled economic developments such 
as water-powered mills and irrigated crops.221  Owners of property abutting 
a water resource could use water as long as it did not unreasonably interfere 
with other riparian interests.222  This basic articulation of riparian rights 
remains the law of water use in many eastern states.223  The second 
evolution, occurring in the mid-twentieth century, was prompted by an 
increase in the demand for water resources just as water supplies were 
becoming more unreliable.224 Administrative agencies stepped in to create 
permit systems that were more nimble than the common law.225  In many 
eastern states water rights are now merely usufructuary.226 
Water laws of the eastern United States now exhibit all three stages of 
doctrinal evolution.  The priority for domestic uses of water remains 
supreme, with potential to support marijuana cultivation for personal use.  
Some states still rely on the common law doctrine of riparianism, and for 
these jurisdictions, commercial marijuana cultivation will have to qualify as 
a reasonable use of water resources, as ambiguous as that may be.  Finally, 
many states employ regulated riparianism to consider water permit 
applications administratively, adding a political dimension to marijuana 
cultivation. 
 
A.  Personal Marijuana Cultivation as a Common Law Domestic Use 
Even the English natural flow doctrine – prohibiting riparians from 
making any use of water that would impair water quantity or quality – 
provides an exception for “domestic” or “natural” uses of water.  These uses 
included small-scale activities that sustain human life, such as drinking, 
bathing, gardening, or raising small quantities of livestock.227  The common 
law doctrine of riparianism, while evolving to require reasonable 
withdrawals or diversions of water, maintained the supremacy of domestic 
use.  In Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. 492, 495 (1842), the Illinois Supreme 
Court went so far as to rule that domestic uses may consume all the water 
                                                 
221 See, e.g., Martin v. Bigelow, 2 Aik. 184 (1827). 
222 JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE WATER FUTURE, VISIONS OF 
2050, Ch. 9 The Law Applicable to Surface Waters in 2050, 86 (Walter M. Grayman et al. 
1st ed. 2012); See also Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (D.R.I. 1827) (in which Justice 
Story required that riparians be allowed a reasonable use of water). 
223 Id. at 90.   
224 Id. at 87. 
225 By, e.g., placing expiration dates on permits or tying water allocation to observed 
flow rates. 
226 See, e.g., Regulated Riparian Model Water Code, Water Laws Committee of the 
Water Resource Planning and Management Division of the American Society of Engineers 
(1997) [hereinafter RRMWC]. 
227 Thompson, supra note 36, at 33. 
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resources of a stream, even if downstream riparians would receive no water 
at all.228  "[A]n individual owning a spring on his land, from which water 
flows in a current through his neighbor's land, would have the right to use 
the whole of it, if necessary to satisfy his natural wants. He may consume 
all the water for his domestic purposes, including water for his stock.”229  
Other courts have articulated a similarly absolute right to use water for 
domestic purposes,230 including the right to use water for a garden or 
greenhouse.231 
The supremacy of domestic uses in riparian jurisdictions should allow 
states to accommodate personal marijuana cultivation without significantly 
disrupting existing water rights or marijuana laws.  No state with a pure (or 
relatively pure232) common law application of riparianism has legalized 
personal marijuana cultivation for recreational use,233 but several have 
legalized personal cultivation for medicinal use.234  Some of these states 
allow medical marijuana patients to grow their own supply.  Maine allows 
patients to grow up to six plants at a time,235 Vermont allows patients to 
grow nine plants,236 while Michigan allows patients to grow twelve.237  All 
three states employ a relatively traditional version of the common law of 
riparian rights.238   The extent to which riparians can cultivate marijuana for 
personal use remains limited by law,239 making it unlikely that personal 
marijuana cultivation could push the boundaries of riparianism’s domestic 
                                                 
228 Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. 491, 495 (1842). 
229 Id. 
230 See, e.g., Wadsworth v. Tillotson, 15 Conn. 366, 373 (1843); Baltimore v. Appold, 
42 Md. 442, 456 (1875); Philadelphia v. Collins, 68 Pa. 106, 123 (1871); Joseph W. 
Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under ‘Pure’ Riparian Rights, 1 WATERS AND 
WATER RIGHTS, § 7.02(b)(1).   
231 Watson v. Inhabitants of Needham, 24 L.R.A. 287 (1894) (ruling that water used in 
operation of a greenhouse is a domestic use). 
232 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95 
MARQ. L. REV. 53 (2011) (noting that a pure application of the doctrine of riparianism is 
elusive). 
233 Several have marijuana legalization initiatives on their ballots for 2016.  See 
BallotPedia: Marijuana on the Ballot, by state (2015) (Aug. 20, 2015),  
http://ballotpedia.org/Marijuana_on_the_ballot. 
234 See ProCon: 23 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC (2015) (Aug. 20, 2015), 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881. 
235 Michigan Medical Marijuana Program, Mich. Pub. Acts 512-514, tit. 22 ch. 558-C 
§ 2423(a)(1)(b) (2008). 
236 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, ch. 86, § 4471 (2007). 
237 Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2624(4)(a) (2008). 
238 Dellapena, supra note 222, at 90. 
239 Even in states where recreational use is permitted, personal cultivation is restricted.  
Colorado, for example, personal cultivation for recreational use is limited to six plants.  
CO. CONST. art. 18, § 16.3(b). 
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use allowance for small-scale gardening.  A narrow reading of Evans v. 
Merriweather may call into question the necessity of recreational marijuana 
and therefore its qualification as a ‘natural’ use of water,240 but recent 
interpretations are more permissive of small-scale gardening.241  
Marijuana’s medicinal properties also further its domestic qualifications.242  
A more ambiguous question is whether marijuana cultivated on behalf 
of medical marijuana patients would qualify as a domestic use of water 
resources.  In many states where patients can grow their own marijuana 
plants for medicinal use, patients may instead designate a primary caregiver 
to grow plants on their behalf.  In Maine, for example, a caregiver may be 
compensated for growing six plants per patient, for a maximum of five 
patients.243  Michigan has similar provisions restricting caregivers to grow 
plants for up to five patients.244  Added to their own medicinal allowance, a 
Michigan caregiver could legally grow a sizable marijuana garden of up to 
72 plants.   
Would an operation of this scale cross the boundary between natural and 
artificial uses of water?  It would seem logical that if a caregiver is growing 
plants on behalf of a patient, and if that patient’s cultivation allowance 
constitutes a domestic use, then the caregiver’s cultivation should qualify as 
a domestic use as well.  But taken to its extreme this logic appears 
untenable: a large-scale cultivator of tomatoes does not have absolute 
domestic riparian rights because those tomatoes are then sold to consumers 
who could have cultivated tomatoes using their own domestic use rights.  
The answer may turn on the nature of the caregiver’s cultivation.  A small-
scale garden or greenhouse should fall within the boundaries of natural use, 
whereas an irrigated marijuana crop may not.245   
In states that employ a regulated riparianism framework based on the 
Regulated Riparian Model Water Code, marijuana cultivation for personal 
use (whether grown by or on behalf of the user) is likely to qualify for a 
permit exemption as long as withdrawals are limited to 100,000 
                                                 
240 “Natural are such as are absolutely necessary to be supplied, in order [sic] to his 
existence[…]The wants must be supplied, or both man and beast will perish.” Evans v. 
Merriweather, 4 Ill. 492, 495 (1842). 
241 E.g., Watson v. Needham, 161 Mass. 404 (Mass. 1894); Harris v. Brooks, 255 Ark. 
436 (Ark. 1955); Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So. 2d 392, 394 (Fla. 1950); Tunison v. 
Harper, 286 Ga. 687 (Ga. 2010). 
242 R. J. Gurley, R. Aranow & M. Katz, Medical Marijuana: a Comprehensive Review, 
30 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 137 (1998). 
243 Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, ch. 558-C, § 2423(a)(2)(b)(c).   
244 See Michigan v. McQueen, 493 Mich. 135 (2013). 
245 An early Michigan case found that irrigation does not qualify as a domestic riparian 
use.  Mastenbrook v. Alger, 110 Mich. 414 (Mich. 1896). 
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gallons/day.246  While the exemption would not apply in common law 
riparian jurisdictions, the figure is relevant to the extent that it provides a 
sense of what a “small-scale” use might constitute.  The cultivation 
restrictions in place today are likely to keep personal marijuana cultivation 
in the realm of domestic uses of water resources.  As those restrictions are 
lifted and personal cultivation expands, or in cases where marijuana 
cultivation takes on a more commercial nature, the comforts of domestic 
use supremacy will give way to the limits of reasonable use. 
 
B.  Commercial Marijuana Cultivation as a Common Law Reasonable Use 
Early cases exploring the contours of riparian doctrine interpreted the 
absolute right to use water for domestic uses to include irrigation.247  
Downstream riparians injured by upstream irrigators had no cause of action 
regardless of the reasonableness of the irrigation scheme.248  Courts have 
moved away from that interpretation, and withdrawals for irrigation must 
now be reasonable vis a vis other riparians.249  Many states have expressly 
ruled that irrigation is a reasonable riparian use,250 but because reasonable 
use determinations are so fact-specific, much jurisprudence has little 
precedential value.251  Marijuana cultivation that does not qualify as a 
domestic riparian use must therefore be reasonable with respect to other 
riparian rights on a case-by-case basis.   
Despite this limitation it is possible to speculate that marijuana 
cultivation in many circumstances can make reasonable use of water 
resources.  While water use estimates for marijuana plants vary,252 riparian 
jurisdictions typically receive more water than their western counterparts,253 
                                                 
246 RRMWC § 6R-1-02(1) (1997). 
247 See, e.g., Weston v. Alden, 8 Mass. 136 (1 Tyng 1811); Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Me. 
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a generalization that has two implications for marijuana cultivation.  First, 
strains capable of being grown outdoors are likely to receive more direct 
precipitation and require less irrigation, increasing the efficiency of 
marijuana cultivation.254  Second, the relative abundance of water resources 
in riparian jurisdictions makes it less likely that marijuana cultivation will 
unreasonably interfere with other riparian rights.  Thus even marijuana 
grown indoors can be accommodated into existing riparian rights 
frameworks.  In determining whether marijuana cultivation constitutes a 
reasonable use, state preferences for agriculture may help marijuana 
cultivation take precedence over other competing uses.  In Minnesota, for 
example, irrigated agriculture will take precedence over all other competing 
uses of water except domestic water supply and small-scale uses.255 
More commonly courts in riparian jurisdictions use a balancing test that 
uses a mix of factors to reconcile competing water uses.256  The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts articulates one such list of factors, among 
which include the purpose, economic value, and social value of the water 
use.257  Evidently it is difficult to predict how reasonable use determinations 
will turn out given the broad parameters of these balancing tests.258  While 
“agriculture” generally speaking is recognized as having economic and 
social value, for example, it is not clear that a court would see marijuana 
cultivation the same way.  One might assume that if a state legalizes the 
commercial cultivation of marijuana its economic and social value would be 
validated, but when measured against other uses it is difficult to predict with 
any certainty how much value marijuana cultivation will be afforded on a 
case-by-case basis.   
Despite the uncertainty, the commercial cultivation of marijuana is 
likely to be deemed a reasonable use sooner or later, if only because 
marijuana legalization and implementing regulations will represent a public 
or legislative affirmation of its value.  The paradox of the High Valley 
Farms case -- wherein growing marijuana plants is legal while watering 
them might not -- may present itself in riparian jurisdictions if the federal 
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marijuana prohibition becomes a factor in what constitutes a reasonable use, 
but more likely is that marijuana legalization allows commercial cultivators 
to make uses of water resources that are reasonable with respect to the 
correlative rights of other riparians.   
 
C.  Regulated Riparianism and the Politics of Marijuana 
Just as state legislatures are continuously passing legislation that builds 
on or modifies legal doctrines in a variety of fields, so too are they 
modifying their doctrines of water law.  Given the drawbacks of riparianism 
– namely that dispute resolution is case-specific and reactive in nature – 
many states have modified the common law of riparianism to give state 
officials more tools to manage water resources more proactively.259  At 
some point the modifications tip the scales and a state is applying some 
form of regulated riparianism instead of the common law.  Where a state 
lies on that spectrum is disputed, but as many as nineteen eastern states now 
feature a regulated riparian system of water allocation.260  These states 
typically administer a permit system wherein water agencies determine at 
the time of application of a proposed use is reasonable.261  The issued 
permits are affixed with expiration dates that allow agencies to re-evaluate 
water uses under changing conditions when the permits are up for 
renewal.262   
In theory regulated riparianism offers many advantages, allocating 
resources more efficiently, quantifying rights and reducing uncertainty, and 
allowing agencies to proactively manage their system of water rights.263  
These advantages should confer on marijuana cultivators just as they do 
cultivators of other crops.  The precision and security of a water permit is 
particularly important to the development of the marijuana industry, 
however, as investors will be hesitant to commit resources to an uncertain 
legal market.  The more certainty marijuana cultivators can have regarding 
their inputs (water being one of the most important), the smoother the 
transition from prohibition to legalization will be.   
If marijuana is treated like any other agricultural commodity, regulated 
riparianism will be even more friendly to cultivators.  In most regulated 
riparian states, agriculture receives preferential treatment compared to other 
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sectors.264  Agricultural water users are expressly defined as reasonable in 
many states,265 while four states even provide exemptions to agricultural 
water users that allow them to make withdrawals without permits or 
extensive reporting requirements.266  In South Carolina, for example, 
agricultural water users avoid the permit process altogether as long as they 
register their withdrawals with the state.267  If marijuana cultivation 
qualifies as agriculture in these states, the marijuana industry will have an 
easier time fitting into existing regulatory frameworks.  It bears noting, 
however, that these systems are not necessarily managing their water 
resources sustainably by giving agricultural users such open-ended water 
rights.  States with little to no checks on agricultural water users are ill-
equipped to promote water efficiency during periods of water scarcity or 
drought.268  The introduction of large-scale marijuana cultivation is likely to 
exacerbate these vulnerabilities. 
The Regulated Riparian Model Water Code provides another avenue for 
the marijuana industry to come into compliance with existing water laws.  
The Code exempts water users making daily withdrawals of less than 
100,000 gallons from state permitting requirements.269 Given the water 
needs of marijuana plants, this would allow cultivation of around 17,000-
100,000 marijuana plants.  Much like Washington’s permit exemption 
ceiling,270 the Code’s exemption for small-scale withdrawals is likely to 
encompass much or all of the marijuana cultivation community by current 
growing standards.  If the exemption were applied to the marijuana industry 
upon legalization, cultivators would be ushered into water regulation 
frameworks smoothly.  But, like permit exemptions for agriculture, 
unchecked water withdrawals do little to address water scarcity.  Even with 
low ceilings water permit exemptions have been shown to have significant 
cumulative impacts that put stress on water resources.271 
In theory regulated riparianism has the potential to provide a smooth 
transition from black market cultivation to legal regulation because agencies 
have more flexibility to administer water rights, but in practice the 
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drawbacks of agency control may manifest themselves in ways that 
undercut the marijuana industry.272  Because administrative agencies have 
significant discretion when making water permit decisions, the influence of 
state and local politics may play a larger role in determining water rights in 
regulated riparian jurisdictions than  common law jurisdictions.273  This 
political side of marijuana regulation may play a particularly strong role 
when agencies are interpreting a key feature of regulated riparianism, the 
“public interest” standard.274  The standard is frequently included in 
regulated riparian statutes, and allows agencies to consider the various 
implications of a permit application holistically.275  But the term is 
ambiguous, and can easily serve to advance political interests.276  Often 
agencies cannot find the right balance between approving and denying 
water permits,277 and the emerging marijuana industry will present an 
additional political and regulatory challenge for agencies to navigate. 
The flip side is true, of course, in that states seeking to cater to the 
marijuana industry may stream-line or facilitate the permit process, but at 
least in the early stages of marijuana legalization it seems more likely that 
state agencies and political appointees would limit permits for marijuana 
cultivation.  In Florida, for example, proposed regulations would limit 
marijuana cultivation permits to a select group of well-connected business 
consortiums.278  A similar plan in Ohio prompted legislators to propose a 
counter-measure that would nullify the marijuana legalization initiative 
altogether.279  One advantage of restricting cultivation to a small number of 
licensed businesses is that it reduces the amount of stress on water resources 
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and regulatory agencies because the number of licensed cultivators is low 
and easy to monitor.  A major disadvantage is that the majority of state 
residents and businesses are shut out of the marijuana industry, while black 
market cultivators are not incentivized to join the regulatory framework.   
Restricting cultivation may buy agencies time while they develop their 
regulatory frameworks, but does not offer a long-term solution.  Existing 
regulated riparian frameworks are capable of welcoming marijuana 
cultivators without significantly disrupting existing water rights and permit 
holders.  The potential scale of cultivation, however, raises broader 
questions about the sustainability of those water management frameworks.  
There are two paths of least resistance: the first would accommodate the 
marijuana industry by allowing cultivators to qualify for permit exemptions 
or agricultural perks; the second would limit water stress by licensing only a 
very small number of marijuana cultivators.  Unfortunately neither of these 
paths address the realities of water scarcity and the emerging marijuana 
industry together.   
This is not the first time that riparian jurisdictions have been challenged 
by the sudden emergence of an industry (e.g., “fracking” for natural gas),280 
and agencies in regulated riparian jurisdictions will have more flexibility to 
make adjustments than their common law counterparts. At the time of 
writing no riparian jurisdiction had legalized the recreational use of 
marijuana, and those that permit medicinal use have not allowed the 
industry to spread its wings.281  It seems likely that legalization will come 
sooner or later to riparian states, and when it does, both common law and 
regulatory applications of the doctrine will need to find the right balance 
between protecting existing water rights, accommodating the marijuana 
industry, and reducing water scarcity. 
 
V. THE CALIFORNIA DOCTRINE  
 
As a general rule, water rights in the American West are governed by 
the doctrine of appropriation, while the doctrine of riparianism controls 
those in the American East.  In reality most states are an exception to this 
rule, blending traditional common law principles with modern 
administrative regulations.282  Some states are more of an exception than 
others, with mixed systems that invoke both riparian and appropriation 
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principles in ways that defy categorization.283  The most prominent of these 
is California, which not only features a notoriously complex water law 
system, but also the largest and most developed marijuana cultivation 
industry in the United States.284  California was the first state to legalize 
medical marijuana,285 but since then attempts to regulate the marijuana 
industry have been feeble.286  At the same time, perpetual drought has 
placed renewed attention on the state’s scarce water resources, including 
water used by marijuana farmers.287  These facts make California the most 
illuminating case study of the convergence of water law and marijuana 
legalization, a collision that illustrates the difficulties other states may face 
in developing their own regulatory frameworks.   
In May 2015, one month before Operation Emerald Tri-County raided 
marijuana farms on Island Mountain, California’s North Coast Regional 
Water Quality Control Board held a workshop in the area to discuss the 
Board’s proposed water quality regulations for marijuana cultivation.288  
The goal was to solicit input from marijuana farmers and invite them to 
participate in a mutually beneficial regulatory scheme.  Farmers would be 
asked to clean up their operations and invest in water quality technologies, 
and in exchange, the Board would give farmers cover to address water 
quality issues openly and legally.289  The farmers in attendance were 
skeptical, but after decades of operating in the shadows many were hopeful, 
too.290  Regulatory efforts like the water quality program can help turn 
marijuana farmers from outlaws into law-abiding businessmen with little to 
fear from government enforcement agencies.  The workshop ended on a 
promising note,291 but several weeks later, local sheriff’s departments and 
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the California Department of Fish and Wildlife conducted the Island 
Mountain raids targeting farmers allegedly violating environmental 
regulations.292   
The incident showed that without a clear framework for regulating 
marijuana cultivation, state and local agencies are taking matters into their 
own hands, subjecting the industry to an overlapping and often 
contradictory set of mandates.  How marijuana farmers are supposed to 
comply with these demands in order to legally irrigate their crops remains 
an open question.  If the California doctrine of water allocation has the 
potential to integrate the marijuana industry into existing water rights 
frameworks, it is not being reached by the state’s approach to marijuana 
cultivation. 
 
A.  California Water Law and Politics 
California water law has been ambivalent since at least 1857,293 when 
the Supreme Court recognized riparian rights two years after having done 
the same for appropriative rights.294  The mixed system has been 
controversial ever since, notably in 1886 when the Court affirmed the dual 
existence of riparian and appropriative rights in Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255 
(1886),295 in the longest opinion in California history.296 The opinion 
clarified that riparian rights do not depend on use, but rather appurtenance 
to land,297 safeguarding inchoate water rights.  Appropriative rights became 
regulated by the state in 1914, requiring a permit to make water 
diversions.298  Later the duality was enshrined in the California Constitution 
by limiting water rights to “such water as shall be reasonably required for 
the beneficial use to be served.”299  A separate, though similar, dual system 
of riparian and appropriative rights was created for groundwater.300 
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As if these mixed doctrines did not create enough controversy over 
water rights, California’s demographic development in the early twentieth 
century created a massive allocation problem: while most of the state’s 
water resources were located north of Sacramento, almost all of its 
population was located to the south.301  In the 1960s southern California had 
sixty percent of the population and only two percent of its water 
resources.302  The situation was untenable, and the ensuing water transfer 
battles created rifts between the north and south, and between rural and 
urban communities, that still fuel resentment and animosity.303   
When the dust settled two water projects transformed California’s water 
landscape.  The Central Valley Project – controlled by the Bureau of 
Reclamation – transfers water from the northern reaches of the state to the 
arid and agricultural Central Valley.304  The California State Water Project 
– controlled by the state Department of Water Resources – brings water 
from northern California to the urban centers of the state, including San 
Francisco and Los Angeles.305  Opposition to these projects was fierce in 
areas where water was being taken, but the flexibility of riparian rights 
allowed the California Supreme Court to find that large-scale water 
transfers did not unreasonably interfere with existing or future rights given 
the social and economic importance of water to the rest of the state.306  The 
appropriative system gave the state another mechanism to transfer water by 
acquiring rights or permits from previous users on a large scale.307 
For the past several years, drought has placed additional stress on 
California’s water resources and web of rights and regulations.308  The state 
has imposed cuts to appropriative water allocations across the board, 
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including appropriative rights that pre-date the 1914 water code (previously 
thought safe from cutbacks).309  Riparian rights, being correlative with other 
riparians, are being reduced pro rata.310  Politically, the state’s drought 
disaster declaration in 2013 put water on the agenda of virtually every 
agency in the state.311  Public opinion has witnessed a similar shift: 
Californians now list ‘water and drought’ as the most important issue facing 
the state, nearly twice as important as ‘jobs and the economy.’312  As is 
often the case when communities are facing a shortage of natural resources, 
blame for the water crisis is being liberally apportioned,313 with marijuana 
representing a convenient scapegoat.314  
 
B.  California Marijuana Law and Politics 
Marijuana’s legal history in the state is not as long-standing, but the 
cultivation of marijuana has been similarly difficult to regulate.  In a round-
about way, marijuana came to dominate the remote regions of northern 
California in the 1960s and 1970s, when the back-to-the-land movement 
inspired urban youth to rediscover rural living and self-sufficiency.  At the 
furthest reaches of the arm of the law, marijuana cultivation became a 
financially feasible way to live off the grid, especially in northern California 
where the land was remote and the logging industry had left behind roads 
and open spaces for farms to populate.315  Around the same time, demand 
for domestically-grown marijuana grew as the US and Mexico began 
spraying Mexican marijuana crops with toxic herbicides that alarmed the 
public.316  Marijuana cultivation in California has flourished in the years 
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since – by 2010 nearly eighty percent of marijuana consumed in the United 
States came from California.317   
California’s dominance in the marijuana supply market was helped by 
the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (established by ballot initiative 
Proposition 215), legalizing the cultivation, distribution, and retail use of 
marijuana for medical purposes.318  What the Act didn’t do, however, was 
create a detailed regulatory framework that would guide compliance and 
enforcement.  Proposition 215 doesn’t specify how much marijuana a 
patient can cultivate, or on behalf of how many patients a caregiver can 
cultivate.319  Subsequent cultivation “guidelines” were established by the 
legislature,320 before being declared inadmissible for criminal conviction by 
the California Supreme Court.321  In addition, local governments (cities and 
counties) are free to establish their own regulatory programs, expanding or 
restricting marijuana cultivation guidelines.322  The end result is that 
marijuana cultivation regulations are unclear and vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.   
The ambiguities in marijuana law did not prevent federal and state law 
enforcement officials from raiding marijuana grows.  At first many of the 
targets were blatantly illegal operations.  In 2010 most of the plants seized 
by authorities were illegally grown on public lands.323  ‘Operation Full-
Court Press’ in 2012 confiscated 632,000 plants from public land sites.324  
More recently law enforcement officials have turned their attention to 
marijuana cultivated on private property, and impacts to water resources 
have been an oft-stated justification.325  There is reason to be skeptical, 
though, as marijuana cultivation organizations have pointed out that state 
regulators have not been consistent in pursuing water rights violations 
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against illegal diversions made by vineyards further south,326 suggesting 
that law enforcement agencies are still primarily concerned with marijuana, 
not water rights.  Regardless, there has been a shift toward enforcement and 
monitoring of marijuana cultivation on private lands, and with it, the need 
to regulate the water rights of marijuana landowners. 
 
C.  Reconciling the California Doctrine with Marijuana Cultivation 
Unfortunately, there does not appear to be a clear path toward 
compliance with the state’s complex water laws for marijuana cultivators, 
nor do agencies have clear mandates.  Both groups are traveling through 
unchartered territory without a map to guide them.  In theory California 
water law could provide several mechanisms for marijuana cultivators to 
obtain water rights.  Much of the marijuana cultivation industry in 
California is located in the water-rich northern regions, where streams and 
rivers fall across the mountainous landscape.  The topography makes it 
likely that many cultivators are on lands with dormant riparian rights that 
can be exercised despite a history of non-use.327  Lands overlying 
groundwater would have similar rights of use.328  The reasonable use 
provision has been promoted as a mechanism to crack-down on 
irresponsible irrigation,329 and the state has the authority to deem riparian 
rights unreasonable that could be invoked to limit riparian rights on 
marijuana farms,330 but the water demands of marijuana are modest 
compared to the large-scale agricultural lands of the Central Valley whose 
water use practices are largely upheld.331  In addition, personal cultivation 
would likely qualify for the state’s domestic use water allowance.332   
Alternatively, cultivators could apply for an appropriative permit from 
the state for unappropriated waters.333  Agriculture is a well-established 
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beneficial use, with no distinction made between crops.334  Like Colorado’s 
High Valley Farms case, a California court could take issue with the legally 
ambiguous nature of marijuana cultivation to find that it does not constitute 
a beneficial use, but state courts have rarely made non-beneficial use 
findings.335 The Rainwater Capture Act of 2012 even allows rainwater to be 
collected from rooftops without an appropriation permit.336   
The problem, then, may not lie with the letter of the state’s water laws, 
but in the way that those laws interact with the politics and policies that 
govern marijuana cultivation.  The patchwork of local and state marijuana 
regulations has created confusion regarding the water rights of marijuana 
cultivators.337  For an industry that has operated in the shadows for decades, 
it still seems easier to use water clandestinely than to expose oneself to 
prosecution.338  For every regional water board trying to work with 
marijuana farmers to improve water management,339 there is a law 
enforcement agency whose budget depends on asset forfeiture laws to 
obtain cash and assets from marijuana raids.340  Agencies with jurisdiction 
over public lands have little incentive to crack down on blatantly damaging 
growing operations if they are responsible for incurring clean-up costs.341   
Water scarcity blamed on marijuana cultivation may even be the result 
of forces outside the control of marijuana farmers and regulatory agencies.  
The area was extensively logged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
reducing soil quality and replacing old growth forests with thirsty young 
trees.342  And the region’s waters have long been diverted to agricultural 
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and urban lands to the south.  Even the Eel River itself – the degradation of 
which was the focus of the Island Mountain raids – is diverted south to 
Sonoma and Mendocino’s wine-producing regions.343 
The marijuana farming community is, strangely enough, actively 
pushing for stronger regulation of their industry.344  In part this is because 
the absence of a clear and comprehensive framework is prompting agencies 
to take marijuana irrigation regulation into their own hands, creating 
uncertainty in the legal marijuana market.  These various regulatory 
initiatives are often at cross-purposes, and the disconnect between the water 
quality control board and the department of fish and wildlife is but one 
example of the deficiencies in California’s regulatory approach.  One 
investment guide found that despite being the largest marijuana market in 
the country, “California is no longer a model for medical cannabis 
legalization because of its lack of statewide regulation.”345   
California’s experience with marijuana legalization and water scarcity 
suggests that a laissez-faire approach to regulation may be ineffective when 
competing demands for water resources are combined with a proliferation 
of local cultivation laws and agency initiatives.  The decentralized nature of 
regulation in California does have the potential to foster innovation as 
agencies experiment with different regulatory approaches, but so far an 
integrated vision has not emerged.  Recreational marijuana legalization may 
appear on California’s ballot on election day, 2016.346  The state’s rocky 
experience with regulating water use for marijuana cultivation to date 
suggests a more integrated and proactive approach is needed to ensure a 
smooth transition to full-blown legalization. 
 
VI. BLAZING A TRAIL TO SUSTAINABLE MARIJUANA FARMING 
 
The early record of marijuana irrigation regulation in Colorado and 
California suggests that states have not given sufficient thought to the 
challenge of regulating water use on marijuana farms.  While some 
jurisdictions have made initial attempts to implement regulations, it is clear 
that a consensus approach or time-tested framework has not emerged.  
Aside from these early experiences, the theoretical applications of water law 
doctrine to marijuana cultivation explored above raise a number of potential 
issues and legal ambiguities that are likely to frustrate agencies and 
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cultivators in the future.   
Fortunately, in jurisdictions where marijuana cultivation is legal to some 
degree, agencies and cultivators have expressed the same goal: to create a 
regulatory framework that is equitable, predictable, and promotes 
sustainable marijuana farming.347  The approaches or doctrinal applications 
explored above tend to fail at least one of these prongs.  In this section the 
costs and benefits of three common regulatory approaches are analyzed.  
More than likely states will need to consider the trade-offs of these 
approaches as they develop their marijuana irrigation regulations.  While 
the characteristics of each state will dictate which of these approaches 
strikes the right balance, the clandestine nature of the marijuana industry 
raises the stakes for states to get it right.  Too little regulation and water 
rights will remain ambiguous and poorly managed.  Too much regulation 
and marijuana cultivators may stay in the shadows altogether.   
 
A.  Power Distribution and the Trade-Offs of Decentralization 
While the multitude of local regulations in California has been 
confusing to many (and unevenly applied), there is a solid basis for 
decentralized regulation.  Distributing power between local agencies 
engages those agencies in the regulatory process.  In doing so, the 
regulatory framework capitalizes on the localized expertise, heightened 
awareness of changing ecological conditions, and existing relationships 
between local stakeholders that collectively form a promising recipe for 
good governance.348  Simply put, local actors are knowledgeable about their 
community and provide legitimacy to local regulations.  Conversely, there 
is often resistance to top-down policies that do not reflect local realities, 
resistance that can manifest itself in non-compliance with regulatory 
requirements.349  A final benefit is that by allowing local agencies to create 
their own policies or manage their own natural resources, the collective 
whole develops resilience by experimenting with different strategies or 
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approaches, some of which might fail while others foster successful 
innovations that can be replicated in other jurisdictions.350 
These benefits of decentralization generally are particularly applicable 
to regulating marijuana cultivation and its corresponding water needs.  
Marijuana remains a controversial political issue, the liberalization of which 
benefits from allowing legalization opponents to enact policies they are 
more comfortable with.351  In regions like northern California where a large 
cultivation community exists in a remote and unique social setting, local 
officials are better suited to engage an introverted industry than state or 
federal officials. They are also more likely to develop regulations that 
reflect the realities of marijuana cultivation, on the one hand, and the water 
resources supply of the region on the other hand.  The North Coast Water 
Quality Control Board, for example, has put forth a water quality regulation 
program for marijuana cultivation that was modified based on feedback 
from marijuana farmers in the north coast region.352  The Central Valley 
Water Quality Control Board did the same in the Central Valley.353  Both 
programs are integrated into an inter-agency, state-wide strategy for 
marijuana irrigation regulation that should facilitate coherence across 
regions.354  This type of regulatory structure is especially helpful when 
states are regulating an industry – like marijuana – that is new or unfamiliar, 
with few established blueprints for success. 
If states pursue a decentralization strategy, however, they will be 
exposed to certain vulnerabilities.  Local agencies and jurisdictions may be 
authorized to develop and enforce their own regulations, but they may not 
have the institutional capacity to do so.   Regulating water used for 
marijuana cultivation implicates complex tasks, like hydrological modeling 
or drug trafficking enforcement, that local agencies may be ill-equipped to 
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handle.355   Even when they are, significant reforms may constitute an 
impermissible government taking requiring compensation, which local 
agencies may not be able to afford.356  Regulation requires investments in 
human, infrastructural, and technological resources that states may not be 
able to provide to local agencies, resulting in some jurisdictions with well-
funded agency operations, and others with little to no regulatory capacities. 
A corollary of the institutional capacity challenge is that local agencies 
may not be equipped to regulate on two dimensions simultaneously, as the 
marijuana-water nexus requires.  Colorado’s Marijuana Enforcement 
Division, for example, is defined by its regulatory identification with 
marijuana, but not water resources.357  The state’s Department of Water 
Resources, conversely, is equipped to handle traditional water cases but has 
received little guidance on how to address marijuana cultivation.358  Both 
institutions are state-level agencies that do not have sufficient 
interdisciplinary expertise.  The challenge can be more pronounced at local 
levels where it can be difficult to establish regulatory capacity on one 
dimension, much less two.   
Efforts to decentralize power away from a central government and 
toward local governments can also, if hastily or sloppily designed, look 
more like power abdication (in which governments shift an unwanted 
burden of regulation onto another jurisdiction) or power fragmentation (in 
which regulatory authorities are ambiguously spread between many 
different agencies).  The former is a problem because while transferring 
power from state to local agencies has its benefits, the state retains an 
important role to play by supporting and coordinating local initiatives.359  
Fragmentation can also be a problem when it leads to overlapping 
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mandates, uncoordinated regulation, or counter-productive policies.360 In 
northern California, the state’s water quality regulators were trying to get 
marijuana farmers to buy into their program at the same time that sheriffs 
departments were conducting raids and making arrests.361  If local agencies 
are authorized to develop regulations concerning marijuana cultivation and 
water allocation, the authorizations should clearly articulate which agency 
has that responsibility, and what the relationship is between that agency, 
other agencies, and the state’s broader regulatory framework. 
 
B.  Cultivation Licensing and the Trade-Offs of Regulating Barriers to 
Entry 
An easy way for states to gradually incorporate legal marijuana 
cultivation into their regulatory frameworks is to dramatically limit the 
number of cultivation licenses available.  While California struggles to 
regulate tens of thousands of marijuana farms, states like Florida,362 New 
York,363 and Ohio364 would limit cultivation licenses to less than a dozen.  
This type of approach allows the state to carefully select responsible 
cultivators, makes it easy to monitor cultivation, reduces pressure on water 
rights and water resources, and buys time before presumably shifting to a 
more expansive model.  With so few cultivators, states can lavish regulatory 
attention on the licensees to ensure environmental compliance, or craft site-
specific rules depending on the water needs and cultivation infrastructure of 
the operation.365   And in a sense the system is predictable by making it 
clear that only a select number of businesses may cultivate marijuana.  
There is no ambiguity with respect to water rights if the purpose of the 
water use is not permitted in the first place. 
There are two major drawbacks to this model.  Although limiting 
cultivation licenses might promote sustainability and reduce the regulatory 
burden, it is hard to find equity when the state permits only a small handful 
of cultivators to participate in the market.  Ohio’s constitutional amendment 
to legalize marijuana includes a list of landowners who would have 
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exclusive rights to cultivate marijuana in the state.366  The attempt to control 
the market prompted some legislators to introduce a constitutional 
amendment of their own that would prohibit the state’s constitution from 
being used to create economic monopolies.367  Even if the state transitions 
to a more permissive model eventually, the previously licensed cultivators 
will have a government-given leg-up on the competition.  And while the 
state may have developed the capacity to create site-specific regulations for 
water management under the restrictive model, those capacities would be 
less relevant when cultivation proliferates and a more comprehensive 
regulatory approach is needed.   
More importantly perhaps, severe limitations on cultivation licenses 
ignore the existence and persistence of black market cultivators and their 
impacts on water resources.  If marijuana cultivation were not occurring to 
begin with, a limited licensing approach might be sensible.  But marijuana 
is widely available in part because domestic cultivation is increasing across 
the United States, particularly on private lands.368  With legalization efforts 
gaining momentum and spreading knowledge on cultivation methods, it 
seems unlikely that marijuana cultivation will remain dormant for long.    
There is no ambiguity with respect to water taken for illegal marijuana 
cultivation (it would not qualify as a beneficial or reasonable use), but water 
resources and water rights holders nonetheless incur the costs of illegal 
diversions if the state cannot ensure compliance.  Considering the size and 
growth of the marijuana industry, eradication of unlicensed marijuana 
cultivators is unlikely.369  Limiting cultivation to a small handful of 
businesses offers transitional benefits, but is unlikely to be a sound long-
term solution. 
 
C.  The No Action Alternative 
The benefits of regulating water allocation have led many states to 
manage their water rights systems administratively, but some have been 
content to let the common law drive the process on the grounds that the 
drawbacks of administrative regulation outweigh the benefits of 
                                                 
366 The amendment’s text includes the tax parcel numbers of the properties in question: 
“Subject to the exceptions set forth herein, there shall be only ten MGCE facilities, which 
shall operate on the following real properties: (1) Being an approximate 40.44 acre area in 
Butler County, Ohio, identified by the Butler County Auditor, as of February 2, 2015, as 
tax parcel numbers Q6542084000008 and Q6542084000041[…]”, Marijuana Reform: 
Amendment Summary (2015) (Aug. 28, 2015), http://yeson3ohio.com/the-amendment/. 
367 H.R.J. Res. 4, 131st Oh. Gen. Assembly.  
368 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin.: Nat’l Drug Threat Assessment 
Summary 25 (2014).  
369 The DEA has described the shift in cultivation practices toward private lands as an 
obstacle to law enforcement and eradication.  Id. at 26. 
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intervention.370  The drawbacks apply just as well to the potential regulation 
of water use on marijuana farms, a consideration that may tempt states to 
take little or no action by allowing marijuana to be subject to the same rules 
and regulations as any other agricultural commodity.   
One advantage of the no action alternative is monetary – creating and 
supporting administrative agencies requires significant investment of state 
funds.  The South Florida Water Management District’s Fiscal Year 2015 
budget was $720.4 million, for example.371  A scathing audit of Colorado’s 
Marijuana Enforcement Division criticized the agency’s unsustainable 
funding model and poor fiscal management.372 Even if states avoid the cost 
of creating new agencies by placing the burden of marijuana-specific 
regulation on existing agencies, they will need to invest in staff, 
infrastructure, and technologies that supply the agency with sufficient 
expertise.373  California put $3.3 million of state funds toward 
supplementing the marijuana regulation capacities of agencies in northern 
California, including the North Coast Regional Water Quality Control 
Board.374  Moving forward, the board’s regulatory programs for marijuana 
cultivation will need to secure enough participation from farmers that 
administrative fees can support the agency’s expenses.375 
The second advantage of the no action alternative is that it avoids the 
possibility that administrative control will lead to poor decision-making or 
inefficient market outcomes.  In states where water is abundant and 
marijuana cultivation will have little to no impact on water resources or 
existing rights, administrative regulation is unnecessary and a poor use of 
scarce resources.376  Washington has more or less adopted this view by 
assuming that all marijuana cultivators will qualify for well water permit 
exemptions.377  South Carolina has taken a similarly permissive stance with 
                                                 
370 See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 222, at 90. 
371 South Fl. Water Mgmt. Dist.: News Release (Sept. 23, 2014). 
372 In one key finding, the audit found that “the Division laid off a majority of its staff 
in Fiscal Year 2012 due to revenue shortfalls. Specifically, in Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012, 
the Division experienced 19 consecutive months of net losses, including a loss of about 
$2.3 million in June 2011 because of large capital purchases, such as furniture, computer 
equipment, and software for a marijuana plant tracking system. Weaknesses in the 
Division’s fee-setting, strategic planning, and expense controls contributed to its funding 
problems.” Co. Office of the State Auditor: Medical Marijuana Regulatory System Part I 
(March 2013); See also John Ingold, Colorado Recreational Marijuana Regulations Need 
Money, Officials Say, The Denver Post (2013) (Aug. 28, 2015), http://goo.gl/qVJWf3. 
373 For an analysis of water governance capacities at the extreme low end of the 
spectrum, see Stoa, supra note 360. 
374 Bauman, supra note 289. 
375 Id. 
376 Abrams, supra note 263. 
377 See supra notes 145-147 (notes on Washington permit exemption for marijuana). 
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respect to agriculture in general.378  And the legal ambiguity of California’s 
cultivation guidelines demonstrates that state interventions may create more 
confusion than clarity.379  From another perspective, a laissez faire approach 
to water management takes advantage of free market forces by allocating 
water rights wherever they are most valued.380  By this logic, marijuana 
cultivation will receive whatever amount of water rights the market dictates, 
maximizing efficiency of use.  In riparian jurisdictions, courts would be 
capable of determining if marijuana cultivation has sufficient economic and 
social value to justify impacts on co-riparians. 
The no action alternative may be ideal in states where water is abundant 
and marijuana cultivation is limited.  That might be the case as states are 
transitioning to marijuana legalization, especially when cultivation licenses 
are tightly controlled.381  But sooner or later cultivation is likely to take root 
on a larger scale, and ignoring the impact that the marijuana industry will 
have on water rights would be unwise.  The costs of regulation may be 
significant, but so are the taxes and fees generated by regulation.382  The 
audit of Colorado’s Marijuana Enforcement Division did not conclude that 
fiscal mismanagement was an issue inherent with marijuana regulation,383 
and the agency has since stream-lined its operations.384  From a broader 
perspective, marijuana may be the largest cash crop in the United States,385 
and some regulatory expertise on this unique crop should be developed even 
if regulatory challenges are less severe than anticipated.   
Claims that free markets will resolve allocation problems fail to 
appreciate the characteristics of both water and marijuana that make the no 
action alternative a questionable approach.  As a scarce natural resource, 
water has never been an ideal example of the sustainability of free market 
principles.386 Similarly, marijuana’s history as a black market commodity 
                                                 
378 See supra note 267. 
379 See supra notes 320-322. 
380 See, e.g., Dustin Garrick, Stuart M. Whitten & Anthea Coggan, Understanding the 
Evolution and Performance of Water Markets and Allocation Policy: A Transaction Cost 
Analysis Framework, 88 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 195 (2013); Jason F. L. Koopman et al., The 
Potential of Water Markets to Allocate Water between Industry, Agriculture, and Public 
Water Utilities as an Adaptation Mechanism to Climate Change, MITIG. ADAPT. STRATEG. 
GLOB. CHANGE (2015). 
381 See supra note 278. 
382 Co. Dep’t of Revenue: Colorado Marijuana Tax Data (Aug. 29, 2015), 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/revenue/colorado-marijuana-tax-data. 
383 See supra note 343.   
384 Eric Gorski, State Marijuana Regulators Pledge Stronger Enforcement, The Denver 
Post (2014) (Aug. 28, 2015), http://goo.gl/49sVaQ. 
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386 See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights to the Twenty-First 
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means that in the absence of oversight, cultivators of marijuana may be 
more comfortable making illegal diversions of water resources than 
cultivators of other crops.  And while allowing marijuana cultivation to 
qualify for permit exemptions (on the grounds that it constitutes agriculture 
or does not consume unsustainable quantities of water) will make it easy for 
farmers to transition to legalization, there are reasons to question the long-
term viability of such open-ended approaches.387  At the moment there is 
little research on marijuana water use at any scale,388 nor is it clear how the 
industry will evolve.  Given these uncertainties, states with significant 
potential for marijuana cultivation or water scarcity may find that, at the 
very least, proactive monitoring of marijuana cultivation and water use is a 
more sound approach than taking no action at all.  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Marijuana legalization in the United States is proceeding at a brisk pace.  
Marijuana is already legal for recreational use in Colorado,389 
Washington,390 Oregon,391 Alaska,392 and Washington DC.393  Between 
now and election day 2016, an additional 14 states may place marijuana 
legalization initiatives on their ballots.394  In addition, 23 states and 
Washington DC have legalized medical marijuana, with up to seven states 
pending legislation.395  There may be setbacks along the way,396 but it 
appears unlikely that states will return to the era of marijuana prohibition 
when cultivation was entirely prohibited and, therefore, conducted on the 
black market.  Of the many regulatory challenges implicated by legalizing a 
popular and lucrative agricultural commodity in such a short time-frame, 
water use is one that is important for both the marijuana industry and the 
water rights system.  It is also a regulatory challenge that states have, so far, 
not given much thought.  There is some potential for existing water laws to 
accommodate marijuana legalization without requiring regulatory 
                                                                                                                            
Commons, (2015) (available at http://goo.gl/ge0Aq5). 
387 Abrams, supra note 267. 
388 E.g., on the plant, farm, or watershed level.  
389 Colorado Marijuana Legalization Initiative, CO. CONST. Amendment 64 (2012).  
390 Washington Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, Initiative 502 (2012). 
391 Oregon Legalized Marijuana Initiative, Measure 91 (2014). 
392 Alaska Marijuana Legalization, Ballot Measure 2 (2014). 
393 Washington D.C. Marijuana Legalization, Initiative 71 (2014). 
394 Ballotpedia: Marijuana on the Ballot (2015) (Aug. 12, 2015), 
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396 Jacob Sullum, Which States Will Legalize Marijuana This Year and  Next?, Forbes 
(2015) (Aug. 28, 2015), http://goo.gl/ywOsFY. 
[22-July-15] WEED AND WATER LAW 57 
intervention from the state,397 but more than likely, states will need to 
develop a regulatory framework (or modify an existing one) that responds 
to the unique demands that legal marijuana cultivation places on water 
resources and water rights.   
In the American West, where prior appropriation still forms the basis for 
most state water law frameworks, states will need to balance the temptation 
to provide marijuana farmers with water access (lest they make illegal 
appropriations or move out-of-state) with existing appropriative rights that 
give priority to senior rights holders.  The federal Bureau of Reclamation 
will make this particularly difficult as long as the federal marijuana 
prohibition persists.  Fortunately, most prior appropriation states administer 
water rights through a regulatory agency that could address the issue 
proactively, without significantly interfering with existing rights.  The prior 
appropriation doctrine will make it challenging to appease a brand new 
agricultural subsector, but states have more flexibility than strict doctrinal 
applications would suggest. 
Riparian doctrine states should have a slightly easier time adjusting to 
legal marijuana cultivation, as riparian rights are not fixed but accommodate 
reasonable uses of shared waters.  Regulated riparian states may not have as 
much flexibility in the short-term if existing permits allocate all of the 
available water resources of a watercourse, but in the long-term agencies 
retain the flexibility to shape water use in the state by controlling the permit 
process.  The flexibility should provide ample room to maneuver in the new 
marijuana economy. 
In many states the challenges of regulating marijuana water use remains 
theoretical.  In California, the issue is very real.  Water is already a scarce 
and fiercely controlled resource, with a complex system of riparian, 
appropriative, and groundwater rights.  The various water rights regimes of 
the California doctrine provide multiple opportunities to create or recognize 
rights to water for marijuana cultivators, but the complexity of the system 
will make it challenging to capitalize on those opportunities.  California’s 
decentralized approach to marijuana regulation, meanwhile, is allowing 
local governments to move in many different directions, sometimes at 
cross-purposes.  The size of the marijuana cultivation industry in California 
is the largest in the United States, and given the scarcity of water resources 
in the state, a more proactive and integrated approach to regulating 
marijuana irrigation is justified. 
Two themes emerge from this study of water doctrine and marijuana 
cultivation.  First, theoretical applications of water law to state-legal 
marijuana cultivation demonstrate that while these doctrines are often 
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criticized for being rigid and antiquated, there is room in the law for 
jurisdictions to provide enough water to marijuana farmers that they will 
participate in the regulatory process without significantly disrupting 
existing water rights.  This is particularly true in jurisdictions that adopt a 
modified or regulatory version of traditional doctrine that softens the 
rigidities of the common law.  The second theme is that in practice, the 
initial signs coming from states where marijuana cultivation is legal to some 
degree suggest that the theoretical ability of water law doctrine to 
incorporate marijuana cultivation is not sufficient to ensure a smooth 
transition.  There are too many legal ambiguities in both water laws and 
marijuana laws for the application of both simultaneously to be able to 
function coherently and consistently.  In order to promote sustainable, 
responsible, and legal marijuana cultivation, while administering water 
rights equitably, states will need to adjust their regulatory frameworks to 
address the challenges that marijuana legalization presents. 
This study focused on prior appropriation, riparianism, and the 
California doctrine when analyzing the relationships water rights regimes 
will have with marijuana cultivation.  These are not the only laws that 
address water resources, however, and further research can build on these 
findings by exploring the ways in which marijuana cultivation will interact 
with groundwater rights, tribal reserved rights, or water quality standards.  
Tribal jurisdictions, for example, hold reserved rights to use water resources 
to irrigate crops,398 as well as significant discretion to craft marijuana 
policy.399  But it is not clear if tribes have reserved rights to use water to 
violate a federal marijuana prohibition.  There is great uncertainty, 
similarly, regarding the impact of marijuana cultivation on water quality.  
The federal Clean Water Act has not been particularly effective at 
regulating agricultural run-off,400 but if states are creating regulatory 
frameworks for marijuana cultivation, there may be an opportunity to re-
think agricultural water quality regulations. 
Research for this study was informed and supplemented by interviews 
with state regulators, local politicians, and marijuana farmers from 
Colorado to California.  Across the board, these stakeholders lamented the 
absence of a clear regulatory framework that could clarify and fairly 
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apportion water rights while promoting the sustainable cultivation of 
marijuana.  There is uncertainty in the application of traditional doctrines 
and regulations to the unknown and quickly evolving marijuana industry.  
That uncertainty is putting farmers at risk despite their often commendable 
intentions, and forces agencies to address the issue without guidance or a 
broader vision for integration.  Said one stakeholder and long-time resident 
of northern California: “the lack of regulation is creating an enforcement 
crisis, an investment crisis, and an environmental crisis.”401  This study has 
shown that state water laws have the capacity to address marijuana 
cultivation, but states and their regulatory agencies will need to play a role 
in the process in order to ensure a smooth transition. 
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